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Jessica Feinberg*
When a child is born, the law makes a critical determination regarding
who will be recognized as the child’s legal parent(s). This determination
carries immense importance both for children and for individuals who are,
or seek to be, identified as legal parents. Essential rights, protections, and
obligations attach to a legally recognized parent-child relationship, and in
the vast majority of cases an individual who is recognized at birth as a
child’s legal parent will retain that status permanently. The determination
of the child’s first legal parent historically has been a straightforward one,
and this largely remains true today outside of the narrow context of
enforceable surrogacy agreements. Namely, the individual who gives birth
to the child long has been, and continues to be, recognized as the child’s
initial legal parent as a matter of course. The determination of a child’s
second legal parent at birth, however, is far less straightforward. In
situations where the individual who gave birth desires for the law to
recognize a second legal parent, that individual’s ability to exercise
meaningful choice within the determination of who is deemed the child’s
second legal parent differs drastically depending on factors such as their
marital status, the method of the child’s conception, and the gender of the
desired second parent. This Article argues that the law’s vastly differing
treatment of individuals who give birth based upon these factors is
problematic. Importantly, there is no underlying theory that provides a
consistent explanation for the law’s current approach to this issue. Reform
is necessary to create a more coherent and just legal framework governing
the degree of meaningful choice individuals who give birth have in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent.
* Copyright © 2022 Jessica Feinberg. Professor, University of Maine School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The determination of who is entitled to recognition as a child’s legal
parent at the time of the child’s birth carries great significance. Legal
parentage provides an individual with critical rights and obligations
relating to the child. For example, legal parents enjoy rights relating to
important matters such as custody, visitation, and medical decisionmaking, as well as core obligations that relate to caring for and
supporting the child.1 The legally recognized parent-child relationship
also provides the child with essential rights and protections in areas
such as, inter alia, inheritance, healthcare, support, and social security.2
Importantly, in most cases the parentage of an individual identified as
the child’s legal parent at birth will never be challenged,3 and even when
challenges are initiated, success is far from guaranteed.4 The result is
that in the vast majority of cases, an individual recognized at birth as
the child’s legal parent will remain the child’s legal parent permanently.
In addition to the significance of the at-birth parentage determination
for the parent in question and the child, the determination also carries
great significance for the child’s other legally recognized parent in
situations where the law recognizes two individuals as the child’s legal
parents at birth. When two individuals are recognized as a child’s legal
parents, they will each have the core rights and obligations relating to
the child that accompany legal parentage.5 In many cases in which both
parents seek to play a role in the child’s life, along with the other rights
and obligations of legal parentage will come the requirement that the
parents communicate with each other and coordinate on a variety of
matters relating to the child.6 As one scholar aptly noted, “the child’s
1 Jessica Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward: Extending Voluntary Acknowledgments of
Parentage to Female Same-Sex Couples, 30 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 113-14 (2018)
[hereinafter A Logical Step Forward].
2 Id.
3 See Jessica Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal of the Marital Presumption for the
Modern Era, 104 MINN. L. REV. 243, 254 (2019) (discussing the infrequency of
challenges to the marital presumption and voluntary acknowledgements of parentage,
which are the most common ways of establishing an individual other than the gestating
parent as a child’s legal parent) [hereinafter Restructuring Rebuttal]; Leslie Joan Harris,
Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 467, 480-81 (2012) (same).
4 See Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 252-54; infra notes 35–37,
82–89 and accompanying text.
5 See Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6 See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 119,
127 (2018) (“Today, live-apart parents are expected to cooperate in co-parenting their
children.”).
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existence will make the parents interdependent for the next eighteen
years.”7 The at-birth determination of legal parentage thus has longterm implications of critical significance for both the child and the
individuals who are, or seek to be, recognized as the child’s legal
parents.
The legal framework governing the at-birth determination of a child’s
legal parents generally employs a straightforward approach for
identifying the child’s first legal parent.8 The law long has automatically
recognized the individual who gestated and gave birth to the child (“the
gestating parent”) as the child’s initial legal parent, i.e., parent zero.9
With the notable exception in some states of births that occur via
enforceable surrogacy agreements, the act of giving birth continues to
bestow automatic legal parentage today.10 The law’s approach to the
determination of who is recognized as the child’s second legal parent at
birth, however, and the gestating parent’s role in that determination, is
significantly more complicated.11 The current legal framework
governing at-birth determinations of a child’s second legal parent
provides differing rules and procedures depending on factors such as
the gestating parent’s marital status, the manner through which the
child was conceived, and the gender of the potential second parent.12
An important consequence of the current legal framework is that there
are significant differences among various categories of gestating parents
regarding the degree of meaningful choice that the gestating parent has
within the determination of the child’s second legal parent.13 While
many gestating parents want a second legal parent to be identified at
birth, the law does not accord all gestating parents’ wishes regarding who
should be recognized as the child’s second legal parent the same
weight.14 For example, current law provides an automatic, mandatory
7 Merle H. Weiner, Family Law for the Future: An Introduction to Merle H. Weiner’s
“A Parent-Partner Status for American Family Law,” 50 FAM. L.Q. 327, 329 (2016).
8 See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 125, 127 (2006).
9 Id.
10 See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2300 (2017).
11 See infra Part II.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law
and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 64 (2004) (“The evidence suggests
that the vast majority of mothers want to share the rights and responsibilities of
parenthood with someone else.”). This Article focuses on the law’s approach to at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent in situations where the gestating parent
desires for someone to be deemed the child’s second legal parent. The law’s approach
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presumption of legal parentage to the individual to whom a gestating
parent was married at the time of the child’s conception or birth (“the
gestating parent’s spouse”).15 While the strength of the presumption and
ability to overcome it at the time of the child’s birth differs depending on
the jurisdiction and method of conception, married gestating parents
generally have either limited or no meaningful choice in the
determination of who is deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth.16
In most jurisdictions, unmarried gestating parents who wish for a
woman to be deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth also lack
meaningful choice.17 This is because voluntary acknowledgements of
parentage (“VAPs”), the primary method of establishing an individual
who is not married to the gestating parent as a child’s second legal parent
at birth,18 extend only to men in the vast majority of jurisdictions.19 At
the other end of the spectrum, gestating parents who were not married
at the time of the child’s conception or birth and who wish for a man to
be recognized as the child’s other legal parent are able to exercise a much
greater degree of meaningful choice under current law.20
The law’s vastly differing treatment of gestating parents’ choice in atbirth determinations of the child’s second legal parent based upon
factors such as marital status, method of conception, and the potential
second legal parent’s gender, is problematic. Notably, there is no
underlying theory guiding the law’s approach to this issue that provides
a coherent, consistent explanation for the differing treatment of the
various categories of gestating parents. While there are a number of
theories that, at first glance, could plausibly be guiding the law’s
approach, a more detailed analysis demonstrates that the current legal
framework governing gestating parents’ ability to exercise meaningful
choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent is

to the determination of the child’s second legal parent in situations where the gestating
parent does not desire for the child to have a second legal parent, while an equally
important issue, is beyond the scope of this Article.
15 See infra Part II.A.
16 See id.
17 See COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 3:3 (2021).
18 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1)(i) (2022) (“The hospital-based portion of the voluntary
paternity establishment services program must be operational in all private and public
birthing hospitals statewide and must provide voluntary paternity establishment
services focusing on the period immediately before and after the birth of a child born
out-of-wedlock.”).
19 See id.
20 See infra Part II.B.
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inconsistent with each of these theories.21 There are, however, core
principles that emerge from the analyses of the plausible theories that
will be helpful in guiding future reform. First, the gestating parent
should have a significant degree of meaningful choice in determinations
of the child’s second legal parent. Second, the law should facilitate atbirth parentage establishment in individuals who, at some relevant
point after the child’s existence has become a reality, share with the
gestating parent a cooperative relationship and commitment to raising
the child as co-parents. These core principles should guide efforts to
reform current law to create a more coherent, consistent, and just legal
framework governing gestating parents’ choice.
This Article examines the law’s approach to the issue of the degree of
meaningful choice gestating parents have in at-birth determinations of
the child’s second legal parent. Part I sets forth the current state of the
law and highlights the vastly differing degrees of meaningful choice
gestating parents are able to exercise under current law depending on
characteristics such as their marital status, the method of the child’s
conception, and the gender of the potential second legal parent. Part II
explores whether there is any guiding theory that provides a consistent
justification for the law’s differing treatment of the various categories of
gestating parents. After engaging in an in-depth analysis of each of the
most plausible potential theories, it concludes that there is no
underlying theory that provides a coherent, consistent explanation for
the current legal framework. Part III begins by identifying the core
principles that emerge across the plausible guiding theories. It
concludes with initial thoughts regarding potential reforms aimed at
better aligning current law with these core principles and creating a
more coherent legal framework governing gestating parents’ choice.
I.

THE GESTATING PARENT’S DEGREE OF MEANINGFUL CHOICE IN ATBIRTH DETERMINATIONS OF THE SECOND LEGAL PARENT

The law has long provided gestating parents with automatic legal
parentage at the time of the child’s birth.22 With the notable exception
in some jurisdictions of births that occur pursuant to enforceable
surrogacy agreements, the act of giving birth generally continues to
provide the gestating parent with automatic legal parentage at the time
of the child’s birth.23 The law’s approach to the determination of the
child’s second legal parent at birth, and the gestating parent’s role in
21
22
23

See infra Part II.
See Meyer, supra note 8, at 127.
See NeJaime, supra note 10, at 2300.
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that determination, however, is more complex.24 The ability of the
gestating parent to exercise meaningful choice with regard to who the
law deems to be the child’s second legal parent at the time of birth differs
significantly depending upon the marital status of the gestating parent,
the method through which the child was conceived, and the gender of
the potential second legal parent.25
A. Married Gestating Parents
1.

Married Gestating Parents Who Conceive via Sexual Means

When a gestating parent who was married at the time of the child’s
conception or birth conceives via sexual means, the law across
jurisdictions automatically provides a second individual with a
presumption of parentage at the time of the child’s birth.26 As a general
matter, married gestating parents lack any significant degree of
meaningful choice with regard to who will be deemed the child’s second
legal parent at birth (at least beyond the choice they made at some point
regarding who to marry).27 This is a result of the longstanding marital
presumption of parentage, which provides an at-birth presumption of
legal parentage to the individual to whom the gestating parent was
married at the time of the child’s conception or birth.28
Since the nation’s inception, the marital presumption has provided
automatic at-birth legal parentage to a gestating parent’s spouse
regardless of the wishes of the gestating parent or the spouse.29 The
spouse’s status as a legal parent remains in place unless a party is able
to later rebut the marital presumption through the relevant legal
proceedings.30 In its earliest form, the marital presumption provided a
virtually irrefutable presumption of legal parentage to the husband of a
woman who conceived or gave birth to a child during the marriage.31
Rebutting the presumption required the initiation of legal proceedings
in which the husband or wife had to prove that the husband did not

24

See infra Parts II.A–D.
See id.
26 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 252 (noting that the marital
presumption of parentage exists in some form in every state).
27 See infra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.
28 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 243.
29 Id. at 248; see Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the
Marital Presumption of Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 564-65 (2000).
30 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 252-54.
31 Id. at 248; see Glennon, supra note 29, at 564-65.
25
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“have access” to his wife during the time of conception, and neither the
wife nor the husband was allowed to testify to this fact.32
While the marital presumption remains firmly in place in every
jurisdiction, the rules for rebuttal have changed over the years. The
spouses are no longer prohibited from testifying in actions to rebut the
marital presumption.33 In addition, in approximately two-thirds of
states, not only do wives, husbands, and child support enforcement
agencies have standing to challenge the marital presumption, but an
individual outside of the marriage who claims to be the child’s biological
father also may seek to rebut the presumption.34 Rebuttal usually
requires, at a minimum, DNA testing results indicating that the
gestating parent’s spouse does not share a genetic connection with the
child.35 In many states, however, courts can refuse to admit DNA
evidence or otherwise deny rebuttal if the court determines that rebuttal
would be contrary to the child’s best interests or that the party seeking
to rebut the marital presumption should be estopped from doing so on

32 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 248-49; Glennon, supra note 29,
at 564-65.
33 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 249.
34 Id. at 252.
35 Id. For an argument regarding the need to change the bases for rebuttal given the
application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples, see generally id. at 254.
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equitable grounds.36 In addition, many jurisdictions have adopted time
limitations on actions to challenge the marital presumption.37
36 See, e.g., In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 6, 13, 15, 20 (Cal. 2004) (holding that another
man’s biological paternity does not necessarily rebut the husband’s presumption of
parentage and that considerations based upon policy and logic, such as the welfare of
the child, factor into the determination of who should be deemed the legal father);
N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354, 357 (Colo. 2000) (“We hold that the best interests of the
child must be of paramount concern throughout a paternity proceeding, and therefore,
must be explicitly considered as a part of the policy and logic analysis that is used to
resolve competing presumptions of fatherhood [between a genetic father and the
husband of the child’s mother].”); Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 827 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that the child’s best interests should be considered in determining
whether the mother’s husband or the genetic father should be deemed the child’s legal
father); In re Marriage of K.E.V., 883 P.2d 1246, 1252 (Mont. 1994) (refusing on
equitable grounds to allow the mother to rebut the marital presumption where the
husband assumed the role of the child’s parent after the mother led him to believe that
he was the child’s father and encouraged him to act on that belief); M.H.B. v. H.T.B.,
498 A.2d 775, 778 (N.J. 1985) (Handler, J., concurring) (refusing on the grounds of
equitable estoppel to allow the husband to rebut the marital presumption where he
“[b]y both deed and word, [] repeatedly and consistently recognized and confirmed the
parent-child relationship between himself and K.B. [and] acted in every way like a father
toward his own child”); Manze v. Manze, 523 A.2d 821, 825 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(refusing on the grounds of equitable estoppel to allow the husband to rebut the marital
presumption where he “acknowledged [the child] as his daughter and assumed the
responsibilities of parenthood throughout a ten-year marriage”); Pettinato v. Pettinato,
582 A.2d 909, 912-13 (R.I. 1990) (refusing on equitable grounds to allow the mother
to rebut the marital presumption where the mother represented to the man in question
that he was the child’s father, the parties married with the intent to raise the child
together as a family unit, the parties lived together with the child and represented
themselves as a family, and the mother did not question her husband’s paternity until
he commenced divorce proceedings); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 197 (Tex. 1994)
(stating that in actions to rebut the marital presumption, “the focus should more
properly be directed toward what is best for the child — it may be in best interest of the
child to allow development of a relationship with the natural father and it may not”);
see also Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody
and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 623 (2009) (“If the presumption is challenged
by the offer of genetic evidence, a number of states have held that a court can refuse to
admit that evidence if contrary to the child’s best interests. Other courts have reached
the same result on the basis that the party offering the rebuttal evidence is estopped to
deny parentage because of the detrimental reliance of the other party or, sometimes, the
child.”); Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance Law and the Marital Presumption After
Obergefell, 8 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 437, 448 (2016) (“Courts do retain the
equitable power to declare that, even despite a genetic connection and the rebuttal of
the presumption, the child’s best interests require the husband to retain legal
parentage.”); Rhonda Wasserman, DOMA and the Happy Family: A Lesson in Irony, 41
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 275, 283 (2010) (“Some states permit the presumption of parentage
to be rebutted only if doing so would serve the child’s best interests. In these states,
when alleged biological fathers claim paternity of children born during an intact
marriage, courts decline to order blood tests or DNA tests to determine paternity unless
the determination would be in the child’s best interests.”).
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Importantly, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in
Obergefell v. Hodges, which mandated that states provided marriage
rights to same-sex couples on the same terms accorded to different-sex
couples, it seems clear that state marital presumption laws must be
interpreted to provide a presumption of legal parentage to both the
different- and same-sex spouses of gestating parents.38 The Supreme
Court’s decision two years later in Pavan v. Smith, which held that if a
state provides the different-sex spouses of individuals who give birth
with the right to be listed on the child’s birth certificate it must do the
same for same-sex spouses, further supports the mandatory application
of state marital presumption laws to same-sex spouses of individuals
who give birth.39 Indeed, most courts that have addressed the issue have
reached the conclusion that, even if written in gendered terms, state
marital presumptions apply equally to same-sex spouses, and a number
of states have formally amended their marital presumption laws to make
them gender neutral.40
Today, the marital presumption remains the most common way of
establishing legal parentage in someone other than the gestating
parent.41 In the vast majority of cases, the marital presumption is never
challenged — meaning it conclusively establishes the gestating parent’s
spouse as the child’s second legal parent.42 This is likely because in most
cases the gestating parent and their spouse mutually desire for the
spouse to be the child’s second legal parent.43 As a result, in many
instances the marital presumption protects the choice a married
gestating parent likely would have made regarding the determination of
the child’s second legal parent at birth if given the opportunity: their
spouse.44 It does this not only by providing the spouse with a
presumption of legal parentage, but also by making it difficult for a
biological father to establish parentage against the wishes of the
gestating parent and their spouse. This is accomplished by rules
37

Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 270.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 680-81 (2015).
39 Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017).
40 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 256.
41 Id. at 254.
42 Leslie Joan Harris, Obergefell’s Ambiguous Impact on Legal Parentage, 92 CHI.KENT L. REV. 55, 67 (2017) (“In the great majority of cases . . . no effort is made to rebut
the presumption.”).
43 See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Reforming Parentage Laws: To Protect and Defend:
Assigning Parental Rights When Parents Are Living in Poverty, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 943, 953 (2006).
44 See id. (“If the mother is married at the time the child is born, she is likely to
designate her husband as her parental partner.”).
38
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allowing courts to deny rebuttal of the marital presumption, regardless
of the genetic evidence, where it would be inequitable or contrary to the
child’s best interests, as well as the time limitations that many
jurisdictions place on challenges to the marital presumption.45
However, not all gestating parents desire the person to whom they were
married at the time of the conception or birth to be the child’s second
legal parent, and these gestating parents will find that they have little to
no ability under current law to exercise meaningful choice regarding
who will be deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth.
A married gestating parent may wish for someone other than their
spouse to be deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth for a variety
of reasons. The process of obtaining a divorce can take years,
particularly in contested cases.46 At the time the child was conceived or
born, the gestating parent and their spouse may long have been living
as if the marriage was over, and the gestating parent may never have
intended for the spouse to be the child’s legal parent.47 Additional
reasons for why a gestating parent may desire that legal parentage attach
at birth to someone other than the spouse may include, for example,
that the spouse has been physically or emotionally abusive or, for other
reasons, the gestating parent believes that providing legal parentage to
their spouse would lead to unhealthy or dangerous results for them
and/or their child.48 The marital presumption, however, does not take
into account the gestating parent’s wishes prior to bestowing a
presumption of legal parentage to the spouse; the spouse is presumed
to be the child’s second legal parent based solely on the fact of their
marriage to the gestating parent at the time of the child’s conception or
birth.49

45 Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 258-59; see also Wasserman,
supra note 36, at 283 (“Courts are quite reluctant to undercut the marital presumption
when the mother and her husband have co-parented the child, the husband has
provided financial and emotional support to the child, and the child has bonded with
the husband.”).
46 Mariela Olivares, A Final Obstacle: Barriers to Divorce for Immigrant Victims of
Domestic Violence in the United States, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 149, 176 (2011).
47 See, e.g., Dana McKee, An Illegitimate Child Conceived or Born During Separation
– Who is the Legal Father?, BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY (July 27, 2020),
https://browngold.com/blog/an-illegitimate-child-conceived-or-born-during-separationwho-is-the-legal-father/ [https://perma.cc/JLP9-3E96].
48 See Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 950, 953 (stating that “[i]f the mother is
married at the time the child is born, she is likely to designate her husband as her
parental partner. If she does not, there is likely a reason for her decision that is
important to her and that is likely to be important to the child”).
49 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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The law’s provision of at-birth legal parentage to the gestating parent’s
spouse is of great consequence. It means that from the time of birth,
that individual will have all of the important rights and obligations that
accompany legal parentage.50 Rebutting the presumption requires the
initiation of legal proceedings, something that many people may be
unable or unwilling to undertake.51 As discussed above, even if a party
is able to file an action to rebut the marital presumption, there are only
narrow circumstances under which such actions will be successful.52
The marital presumption’s automatic, mandatory provision of legal
parentage to the spouses of gestating parents thus has significant,
enduring effects.
It should be noted, however, that in around half of states married
gestating parents arguably have a somewhat greater degree of
meaningful choice with regard to who the law deems the child’s second
legal parent at the time of birth. Specifically, in approximately half of
states, a married gestating parent is allowed to execute a VAP at the time
of the child’s birth with someone other than their spouse, but only if the
spouse is willing to execute a document declaring that they are not the
child’s biological father and waiving their presumed legal parentage.53
50 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 113-14 (describing the rights
and obligations that accompany legal parentage).
51 See supra notes 33–37 and accompanying text; see also Czapanskiy, supra note
43, at 956 (“Judicial proceedings can be beyond the means of low-income or middleincome families . . . .”).
52 See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
53 See, e.g., ARIZ. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY 1 (2017),
http://www.azdhs.gov/documents/licensing/vital-records/register-acknowledgementpaternity.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3VE-W7X5]; ARK. OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY, http://www.dfa.arkansas.gov/offices/childSupport/
Documents/aopPage1English.pdf (last visited Dec. 21, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8ATR-US6J];
STATE OF COLO., VOLUNTARY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY 1 (2016),
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/CHED_VR_Form_Acknowledgementof-Paternity_English0916.pdf [https://perma.cc/C74Q-MKQU]; ME. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., MAINE CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FORM NO. VS27-A,
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF PATERNITY 3 (2016), https://www.maine.gov/dhhs/mecdc/publichealth-systems/data-research/vital-records/documents/pdf-files/VS27-A.pdf [https://perma.
cc/N622-4MJB]; Frequently Asked Questions, ILL. HEALTHCARE & FAMILY SERVS., CHILD
SUPPORT SERVS., https://www.illinois.gov/hfs/ChildSupport/hospitals/Pages/FAQs.aspx
#other (last visited Jan. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/ZWP3-WEPW]; Glossary of Family Law
Terms, ALASKA CT. SYS., SELF-HELP CTR.: FAM. L., http://www.courts.alaska.gov/shc/
family/glossary.htm#aff-pat (last updated Mar. 21, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MVJ8-S8HN];
Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity, DEL. CHILD SUPPORT SERVS.,
https://www.dhss.delaware.gov/dcss/volack.html#:~:text=Voluntary%20Acknowledgement
%20of%20Paternity%20(VAP,the%20parents%20are%20not%20married.&text=There%20i
s%20no%20fee%20for,placed%20on%20the%20birth%20certificate (last visited Dec. 21,
2021) [https://perma.cc/978A-J9C3]. Federal law requires only that states make VAPs
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If the spouse is not willing to execute the document, the law will
continue to recognize the spouse as the child’s second legal parent at
birth pursuant to the marital presumption.54 If the spouse is willing to
waive their legal parentage, it has the effect of establishing the
individual named in the VAP, and not the spouse, as the child’s second
legal parent at the time of the child’s birth.55 Even in the jurisdictions
that allow married gestating parents to, with their spouse’s consent,
execute VAPs with someone other than their spouse, the availability of
VAPs is limited to certain categories of people. Specifically, in the vast
majority of jurisdictions, VAPs can only be used to establish the
parentage of men.56 Consequently even in jurisdictions that allow a
married gestating parent to utilize a VAP to establish at-birth legal
parentage for someone other than their spouse in situations where the
spouse is willing to waive their presumed parentage, this avenue is only
available if the person who the gestating parent desires to be deemed
the child’s other legal parent at birth is a man.57
2.

Married Gestating Parents Who Conceive via Assisted
Reproductive Technology

When a married gestating parent conceives via assisted reproductive
technology (“ART”), laws in most jurisdictions provide an additional
mechanism, beyond the traditional marital presumption, for the at-birth

available to unmarried individuals who give birth, and a number of state VAP forms specify
that VAP procedures are unavailable when a child is born to a married mother. Feinberg, A
Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 128-29.
54 See sources cited supra note 53. In West Virginia, a married gestating parent
also is able to execute a VAP with someone other than their spouse if they submit
DNA evidence demonstrating that the alleged father is the biological father. Adding
and Removing Fathers, W. VA. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RES.,
http://www.wvdhhr.org/bph/hsc/vital/paternity.asp (last updated Mar. 15, 2012)
[https://perma.cc/Y53U-TJZ2]. The spouse’s consent is not required in this situation. Id.
55 See sources cited supra note 53. If the parentage of the gestating parent’s spouse
is later disestablished through post-birth legal proceedings, the gestating parent may
then be able to utilize a VAP to establish the parentage of someone other than their
spouse without their spouse’s consent. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
AFFIDAVIT OF PARENTAGE 1, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/Parentage_10872_7.pdf
(last visited Feb. 22, 2022) [https://perma.cc/QX8R-RHDM] (“Further, the mother
states that she was not married when this child was born or conceived; or that this child,
though born or conceived during a marriage, is not an issue of that marriage as
determined by a court of law.”).
56 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 17, § 5:22.
57 See id.
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determination of a second legal parent.58 Like the marital presumption,
however, this avenue of establishing parentage functions solely to grant
an at-birth determination of legal parentage to the person to whom the
gestating parent was married during the relevant time period.
Specifically, these laws state that a husband who consents to his wife’s
use of assisted reproduction with the intent to be the resulting child’s
parent is the child’s legal parent regardless of whether his genetic
materials were used to conceive the child.59 Some of the spousal consent
to ART laws explicitly require consent from both parties, while the
language of others only expressly identifies the spouse’s consent as a
requirement.60 Unlike the marital presumption, which generally

58 Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1184-85 (2010) (describing states’
approaches).
59 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 17, §§ 3:3, 3:4; Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral,
Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men
and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 165 (2000).
60 Compare ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.045 (2022) (“A child, born to a married woman
by means of artificial insemination performed by a licensed physician and consented to
in writing by both spouses, is considered for all purposes the natural and legitimate
child of both spouses.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-774 (2022) (“Any child or children
born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status of a
naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife who consented to and
requested the use of A.I.D.”); FLA. STAT. § 742.11(1) (2022) (“[A]ny child born within
wedlock who has been conceived by the means of artificial or in vitro insemination is
irrebuttably presumed to be the child of the husband and wife, provided that both
husband and wife have consented in writing to the artificial or in vitro insemination.”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-21 (2022) (“All children born within wedlock or within the usual
period of gestation thereafter who have been conceived by means of artificial
insemination are irrebuttably presumed legitimate if both spouses have consented in
writing to the use and administration of artificial insemination.”); and KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-2302 (2022) (“Any child or children heretofore or hereafter born as the result of
heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same
as a naturally conceived child of the husband and wife so requesting and consenting to
the use of such technique.”), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (2022) (“Any child
born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination shall be deemed the
legitimate natural child of the woman and the woman’s husband if the husband consents
in writing to the artificial insemination.”); IDAHO CODE § 39-5405(3) (2022) (“The
relationship, rights and obligation between a child born as a result of artificial
insemination and the mother’s husband shall be the same as for all legal intents and
purposes as if the child had been naturally and legitimately conceived by the mother
and the mother’s husband, if the husband consented to the performance of the artificial
insemination.”); LA. CIV. CODE art. 188 (2022) (“The husband of the mother may not
disavow a child born to his wife as a result of assisted conception to which he
consented.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 46 § 4B (2022) (“Any child born to a married woman
as a result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered
the legitimate child of the mother and such husband.”).
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provides a rebuttable presumption of parentage, the parentage that
attaches to a gestating parent’s spouse pursuant to spousal consent to
ART laws is conclusive in most jurisdictions.61 While many of the
spousal consent to ART laws are written in gendered terms, most courts
that have addressed the issue have held that under Obergefell and Pavan,
these laws extend to a woman who, with the intent to be the resulting
child’s parent, consents to her spouse’s use of assisted reproduction to
conceive.62
Avoiding the application of a jurisdiction’s spousal consent to ART
law to the gestating parent’s spouse may require proof that the necessary
consent was lacking or that the law’s technical requirements were not
satisfied.63 In terms of technical requirements, some states’ spousal
consent to ART laws mandate that the required consent be set forth in
writing and/or that the procedure involve a physician.64 However, even
Viewing the approach of the latter jurisdictions charitably, perhaps it is based on the
assumption that if a spouse knew of the gestating parent’s use of ART and was given the
opportunity to provide consent, both parties must have desired for the spouse to be the
child’s other legal parent. This, however, is far from clear. Regardless, the better
approach would be for states to make this requirement explicit. See Joslin, supra note
58, at 1225 (“Under a contrary rule, the gestational/intended parent would have no
control over who would be her child’s other parent; it could even be someone unknown
to or estranged from her. To remove any remaining uncertainty about this issue, this
requirement [that the gestating parent also consent] should be made explicit.
Specifically, the law should provide that an individual who consents to alternative
insemination by a woman with the intent to be a parent of the resulting child and with
the consent of the woman is a parent of the resulting child.”).
61 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:4.
62 Id.
63 The law may presume that the spouse has consented to the gestating parent’s use
of ART. See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 6, at 138 (“While most of these statutes condition
the husband’s paternal status on his consent to the insemination, there is a strong
presumption that the husband gave such consent.”); Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps,
The Changing Family and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Impact of Medical Reproductive
Technology on the Immigration and Nationality Act’s Definition of the Family, 11 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 429, 448 (1997) (“Where the husband contends that he did not consent to
the procedure or that he withdrew consent before conception, courts tend to place the
burden of proof upon the husband to show that consent was not given or was
withdrawn. Sometimes the husband must prove the lack of consent by clear and
convincing evidence.”); Marla J. Hollandsworth, Gay Men Creating Families. Through
Surro-Gay Arrangements: A Paradigm for Reproductive Freedom, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L.
183, 230 (1995) (“Some states impute consent to the husband absent evidence to the
contrary, while others provide that consent of the husband is presumed.”); Michael J.
Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations Resulting from Human Artificial
Insemination, 83 A.L.R. 4th § 2[a] (2020) (“It has also been recognized that the consent
of the husband, out of which his support obligation arises, may be presumed unless
convincing proof is offered that he did not in fact give such consent.”).
64 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 106.

2286

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2271

if a spousal consent to ART law does not establish the spouse’s legal
parentage at birth, the marital presumption of parentage, which
provides the gestating parent’s spouse with a rebuttable presumption of
legal parentage at birth regardless of the method of conception, exists
in every state.65 Overall, spousal consent to ART laws do not expand the
class of individuals who can be established at birth as the second parent
of a child born to a married gestating parent; like the marital
presumption, spousal consent to ART laws can only be utilized to
establish the spouse as the child’s second parent.
In sum, regardless of the method of conception, a gestating parent
who is married at the time of conception or birth has little choice with
regard to who will be deemed the child’s other legal parent at birth.
With one narrow exception that exists in only half of jurisdictions, the
law generally provides a mandatory at-birth determination of legal
parentage to the gestating parent’s spouse, regardless of whether this is
what the gestating parent desires. Not all gestating parents, however,
are similarly constrained. Compared to married gestating parents,
certain categories of gestating parents who were not married at the time
of the child’s conception or birth (“unmarried gestating parents”), have
significantly greater meaningful choice with regard to who is deemed
the child’s second legal parent at birth.66
B. Unmarried Gestating Parents
1.

Unmarried Gestating Parents Who Conceive via Sexual Means

Unmarried gestating parents who conceive via sexual means and
desire a male co-parent enjoy a significant degree of meaningful choice
with regard to who will be deemed the child’s second legal parent at
birth. Today, VAPs, which are usually executed at the hospital at the
time of the child’s birth,67 are the most common way of establishing a
second legal parent for a child born to an unmarried gestating parent.68
The federal guidelines governing VAP procedures stem from reform to
65 See, e.g., Wendy G-M. v. Erin G-M., 985 N.Y.S.2d 845, 853-55 (Sup. Ct. 2014)
(holding that although the parties had not complied with the formal requirements of
the spousal consent to assisted reproduction statute, the marital presumption provided
a separate means for establishing the spouse’s parentage).
66 See infra Parts II.C.–D.
67 Nancy E. Dowd, Parentage at Birth: Birthfathers and Social Fatherhood, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 909, 920 (2006) (“[A] recent study indicates six of seven paternities
are voluntary, virtually all of which are acknowledged at the hospital.”).
68 Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 469 (2012).
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federal child support and welfare laws in the 1990s,69 although a
number of states had established VAP procedures well before that
point.70 Federal guidelines mandate that VAPs are offered by all birthing
hospitals, both public and private, as well as all birth records offices.71
The federal government’s goals in requiring states to adopt VAP
procedures included decreasing government spending on welfare
programs by facilitating the identification of two legal parents from
whom child support could be sought as early as possible following the
child’s birth.72 Prior to the implementation of VAP procedures in the
United States, children born to unmarried gestating parents generally
could have only one legal parent — the gestating parent — at the time
of birth, establishing a second legal parent required the initiation of
legal proceedings after the child’s birth.73
To execute a VAP, the gestating parent and the man who they seek to
identify as the child’s second legal parent simply must sign a document
acknowledging the man’s paternity and have their signatures
authenticated by a notary or witness.74 Prior to the VAP’s execution,
69 Jeffrey A. Parness, No Genetic Ties, No More Fathers: Voluntary Acknowledgement
Rescissions and Other Paternity Disestablishments Under Illinois Law, 39 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1295, 1298 (2006); Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgements at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 53,
56-57 (2010); Caroline Rogus, Fighting the Establishment: The Need for Procedural
Reform of Our Paternity Laws, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 67, 75-77 (2014).
70 See, e.g., In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 193 (Tex. 1994) (“With the enactment of
the Texas Family Code in 1973, a method was statutorily afforded a putative father to
establish his paternity voluntarily.”); Rogus, supra note 69, at 78 (describing the
establishment of VAPs in Washington, D.C. in the 1970s).
71 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1)(i)-(ii) (2022); Harris, supra note 68, at 476.
72 See Susan F. Paikin & William L. Reynolds, Parentage and Child Support: Interstate
Litigation and Same-Sex Parents, 24 DEL. LAW. 26, 28-29 (2006) (“Spurred to action by
the burgeoning number of nonmarital children and the attendant child poverty and
welfare dependence associated with single-parent families, Congress required states to
enact and use expedited procedures to streamline paternity establishment . . . to ensure
that nonmarital children gained the financial and emotional benefit of two parents.”);
Julia Saladino, Is a Second Mommy a Good Enough Second Parent?: Why Voluntary
Acknowledgements of Paternity Should be Available to Lesbian Co-Parents, 7 MOD. AM. 2,
2 (2011) (explaining that the goals of the federal government in adopting VAP
requirements included the establishment of legal parentage for two individuals “as early
in a child’s life as possible,” in order to facilitate the collection of child support); see also
Jayna Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity: Should Biology
Play a Role in Determining who Can be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 481 (2005)
(“Thus, in an effort to ensure support for a child born out of wedlock, the government
has made it virtually effortless to become a legally recognized father.”).
73 Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L.
REV. 465, 475-76 (2016).
74 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(4).

2288

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 55:2271

notice must be provided to the parties, both orally and in writing, “of
the alternatives to, the legal consequences of, and the rights . . . and
responsibilities” of acknowledging parentage.75 While generally either
signatory may rescind the VAP within sixty days of its execution, after
that point VAPs can only be challenged on the grounds of duress,
material mistake of fact, or fraud.76 A VAP that is not rescinded within
sixty days must be “considered a legal finding of paternity”77 and states
must give full faith and credit to validly executed out-of-state VAPs.78
Importantly, while many states’ VAP forms or accompanying
instructions state that in signing the VAP the parties are attesting under
penalty of perjury that, to the best of their knowledge, the man is the
child’s biological father,79 states cannot require putative fathers to
submit to genetic testing before signing a VAP at the time of the child’s
birth.80 As a result, a biological tie between the man and the child does
not need to be proven in order for a man’s legal parentage to be
established through the execution of a VAP.81 As Professor Jeffrey
Parness has explained, “VAP statutes usually are employed by birth
mothers and unwed men, with or without biological ties to [the child],
who seek to establish legal paternity.”82 Indeed, one study found that
even when given the opportunity to take a free DNA test before signing
the VAP, the vast majority of men refused.83 Federal law’s prohibition
on requiring genetic testing before executing a VAP has resulted in a
system in which VAPs can be, and are, utilized in situations where the
parties desire to establish the man as the child’s second legal parent
regardless of whether he shares biological ties with the child.
The nationwide availability of VAPs to establish a man as the second
legal parent of a child born to an unmarried gestating parent provides
75

Id. § 303.5(g)(2)(i).
42 U.S.C. §§ 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)-(iii) (2018). States differ with regard to which
categories of individuals have standing to challenge VAPs. Jeffrey A. Parness, Faithful
Parents: Choice of Childcare Parentage Laws, 70 MERCER L. REV. 325, 351-53 (2019)
[hereinafter Faithful Parents].
77 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii).
78 Id. § 666(a)(5)(C)(iv).
79 See Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56 B.C. L. REV.
1647, 1686-87 (2015). As Leslie Harris has explained, “Federal statutes that require
states to establish VAPs do not provide that the man signing a VAP must aver that he is
the child’s biological father.” Harris, supra note 68, at 479.
80 See 45 C.F.R. § 302.70 (a)(5)(vii) (2022).
81 See Baker, supra note 79, at 1687 (“Congress did not mandate that the VAP be
tied to genetics.”).
82 Parness, Faithful Parents, supra note 76, at 345-46.
83 Harris, supra note 68, at 477.
76
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unmarried gestating parents with a significant degree of choice within
the determination of who will be deemed the child’s second legal parent
at birth. At the time of the child’s birth, the gestating parent can choose
who they want to be the child’s other parent, and as long as they choose
a man who is willing to sign the VAP, the law will recognize the
individual chosen as the child’s second legal parent. As discussed above,
that individual will remain the child’s legal parent unless the VAP is
rescinded within sixty days or successfully challenged after that point,
which is allowed in only narrow circumstances involving duress,
material mistake, or fraud.84 While the most frequent challenges to
VAPs are based upon claims “that the [gestating parent] committed
fraud by misleading the man about his biological paternity or that there
is a material mistake of fact because the man is not the biological father,”
proof that the man identified in the VAP is not the child’s biological
father will not necessarily result in the disestablishment of the man’s
legal parentage.85 Some courts require evidence of fraud or mistake in
addition to the genetic testing results and/or deny the disestablishment
of paternity if doing so would be inequitable under the circumstances
or contrary to the best interests of the child.86 As Professor Katharine
Baker has explained, “[m]any courts are growing increasingly
comfortable with treating VAPs as final, legal judgments, regardless of
what the genetic evidence might show.”87 While there is, of course,
always a chance that a VAP will be successfully challenged, over one
million VAPs are executed each year, and in most cases the VAP will
never be challenged and the person with whom the gestating parent
chose to execute the VAP will remain the child’s legal parent
permanently.88
While VAPs provide many unmarried gestating parents with
significant, meaningful choice in the determination of who will be
deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth, this is not true for all
unmarried gestating parents. As noted above, in the vast majority of
states VAP procedures can only be utilized to establish the legal

84 See supra notes 76–78. Some states also employ time limitations for challenges to
VAPs. See Parness, Faithful Parents, supra note 76, at 353.
85 Harris, supra note 68, at 479-80.
86 Id. at 480-81.
87 Baker, supra note 79, at 1687.
88 OFF. OF CHILD SUPPORT ENF’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 144 (2016),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ocse/fy_2016_annual_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GBA-GYP2] (setting forth the number of VAPs executed in the
United States each year).
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parentage of men.89 As a result, in most states unmarried gestating
parents who wish for a woman to be deemed the child’s second legal
parent at birth cannot utilize VAPs to establish the legal parentage of
their desired co-parent.90
2.

Unmarried Gestating Parents Who Conceive via Assisted
Reproductive Technology

For unmarried gestating parents who conceive via ART, there is one
other potential mechanism besides the VAP that provides for at-birth
determinations of a second legal parent. This mechanism, however, is
only available in a relatively small minority of states. Specifically, as of
2021, approximately sixteen jurisdictions have adopted consent to ART
laws that extend to an individual who consents to an unmarried
gestating parent’s use of ART with the intent to be the resulting child’s
parent.91 Similar to the spousal consent to ART laws discussed above, a
conclusive presumption of parentage generally attaches under these
laws to the individual who consents to an unmarried gestating parent’s
use of ART.92 In thirteen of the sixteen jurisdictions, the law is written
in gender neutral terms with regard to the individual who is deemed a
legal parent at birth based upon their consent to the unmarried gestating
parent’s use of ART.93 This means that (assuming these laws also require
the gestating parent’s consent) unmarried gestating parents who
conceive via ART in these thirteen jurisdictions can choose an
individual of any gender to be the child’s second legal parent.94
In sum, the degree of meaningful choice unmarried gestating parents
are able to exercise in the determination of who is deemed the child’s
second legal parent at birth depends largely on the gender of their
desired co-parent. Across jurisdictions, unmarried gestating parents
who desire a man to be deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth
89 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:3 (identifying seven states as having extended
parentage establishment through VAPs to women).
90 Instead, after the child is born, an unmarried gestating parent and the woman
who the gestating parent wishes to be the child’s second legal parent generally must
pursue a second parent adoption in order to establish the woman as the child’s second
legal parent. Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 111-12. Unfortunately,
second parent adoptions are not permitted in a number of jurisdictions, and, even in
jurisdictions that grant second parent adoptions, the process can be lengthy, expensive,
and onerous. Id. at 112-13.
91 JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:3.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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enjoy a significant degree of meaningful choice under current law.
Regardless of the method of conception and the availability of nonspousal consent to ART statutes, unmarried gestating parents who
desire a man to be deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth can
utilize VAPs to establish at-birth legal parentage for their desired coparent.95 Unmarried gestating parents who desire a woman to be
deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth, however, are left
without meaningful choice in most jurisdictions. This is because in the
vast majority of jurisdictions, neither VAPs nor non-spousal consent to
ART statutes can be utilized to establish the parentage of women.96
C. A Note on Gestating Parents’ Degree of Choice in Post-Birth
Parentage Establishment
This Article focuses primarily on the degree of meaningful choice
gestating parents are able to exercise in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent. However, a brief discussion of parentage
establishment mechanisms that gestating parents may be able to utilize
to establish an individual as the child’s second legal parent after birth
will provide context that is useful in understanding why parentage
determinations that attach at birth are so important. When a gestating
parent cannot or does not establish their desired co-parent as the child’s
second legal parent through the at-birth mechanisms discussed above,
the additional parentage establishment methods that arise after birth
generally are limited and, importantly, require the initiation of legal
proceedings.97 For married gestating parents who conceived via ART
and desire someone other than their spouse to be the child’s second
legal parent, if the jurisdiction’s consent to ART statute applies, the
spouse is conclusively deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth
and the gestating parent will not have ability to choose someone else
post-birth.98 For married gestating parents whose spouse is recognized
as the child’s other legal parent at birth pursuant to the marital
presumption, the first step the gestating parent will need to take to
establish someone else as the child’s second legal parent is to bring an

95

See supra Part I.B.
See supra notes 89–90, 93 and accompanying text.
97 This proposition refers to mechanisms that become available only after birth.
VAPs, on the other hand, become available at birth and may also be executed post-birth
at state birth records offices; VAPs do not require the initiation of legal proceedings. See
supra notes 70, 77–78.
98 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
96
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action to rebut the marital presumption.99 As discussed above, this will
generally require proof that the child and the spouse do not share
genetic ties, and, if the gestating parent seeks to establish the child’s
biological father as the child’s second legal parent, proof of the alleged
biological father’s genetic ties to the child.100 However, courts may deny
rebuttal, despite the spouse’s lack of genetic ties to the child, if the court
determines that it would be contrary to the child’s best interests or
inequitable.101 If the spouse’s legal parentage is rebutted and the rebuttal
proceedings do not involve establishing the child’s biological father as
the second legal parent, the married gestating parent could then utilize
the post-birth mechanisms available to unmarried gestating parents to
establish a second legal parent.
For unmarried gestating parents who could not or did not utilize
VAPs or consent to ART laws to establish an individual as the child’s
second legal parent and who do not already have a legally recognized
co-parent, there are a couple of additional post-birth parentage
establishment mechanisms available.102 The first mechanism can be
used only to provide parentage to the child’s biological father. If an
unmarried gestating parent desires the child’s biological father to be
deemed the child’s second legal parent, the gestating parent can initiate
legal proceedings (on their own or through a child support enforcement
agency) to establish the biological father’s legal parentage on the basis
of DNA evidence.103 Federal law requires that state procedures “create
a rebuttable or, at the option of the State, conclusive presumption of
paternity upon genetic testing results indicating a threshold probability
that the alleged father is the father of the child.”104 Importantly, even if
99 This would be the case if the VAP processes available in around half of
jurisdictions to married gestating parents, which require the consent of the gestating
parent, the spouse, and the alleged biological father, were not utilized. See supra notes
52–57 and accompanying text.
100 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
102 While VAPs are available after birth, not every unmarried gestating parent will be
able to utilize the VAP to establish their desired co-parent as the child’s second legal
parent. As discussed above, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, VAPs cannot be utilized
to establish the parentage of women. See supra notes 89–90. In addition, the period of
time following birth for which VAPs can be utilized to establish an individual’s legal
parentage differs by jurisdiction. How to Establish Paternity, NOLO,
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/free-books/living-together-book/chapter74.html (last viewed Jan. 8, 2021) [https://perma.cc/33JD-CT69]. Finally, some VAP
forms require the individual who seeks to establish parentage to swear that they are the
child’s “natural” or biological father. Baker, supra note 79, at 1686.
103 Glennon, supra note 29, at 569.
104 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(G) (2018).
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the gestating parent does not wish to establish the biological father as
the child’s second legal parent, other interested parties such as the
biological father or, if the gestating parent receives public benefits, a
child support enforcement agency, may seek to establish the biological
father’s legal parentage through this mechanism.105
The other parentage establishment mechanism available to unmarried
gestating parents who could not or did not utilize VAPs or consent to
ART laws to establish the child’s second legal parent and who do not
yet have a legally recognized co-parent, involves adoption.106 While this
option provides a greater degree of choice to the unmarried gestating
parent with regard to who can be deemed the child’s second legal
parent, adoption can be an expensive, intrusive, and lengthy process.107
If a gestating parent marries their desired co-parent after the child’s
birth, the couple can pursue a stepparent adoption to establish the
gestating parent’s spouse as the child’s second legal parent without
terminating the gestating parent’s parental rights.108 If the gestating
parent remains unmarried, a second parent adoption would allow the
parties to establish the gestating parent’s desired co-parent as the child’s
legal parent without terminating the gestating parent’s rights.109

105 See Glennon, supra note 29, at 569. Specifically, if a gestating parent receives
public benefits and the child does not have a second legal parent, then the gestating
parent can be required to assist the child support agency in establishing the legal
paternity of the child’s biological father. Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 955.
106 There are also function-based methods of establishing parentage in some
jurisdictions. More specifically, if the gestating parent allows another individual to live
with the child and to function in the role of the child’s parent for a sufficient period of
time, then that individual may be able to eventually obtain legal parentage or certain
parental rights through holding out provisions or other equitable parenthood doctrines.
See generally Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable
Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining Formal
Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55 (2017) (discussing the importance of
maintaining function-based avenues of establishing parental rights).
107 Id. at 81-82 (describing the costs and procedures involved in step- and secondparent adoptions).
108 Id. at 80 (“Even in jurisdictions that waive requirements such as financial
accountings and home studies, the stepparent adoption procedure can nonetheless be
costly and complicated. Many individuals require the assistance of an attorney to
navigate the process and thus incur attorney’s fees, and the procedure often requires,
inter alia, submitting various documents, paying court fees, appearing in court, and
submitting to a background check.”).
109 See id. at 81-82 (“[U]nlike for stepparent adoptions, home studies, which can be
intrusive and costly and can prolong the adoption process, are generally required for
second parent adoptions (although some states grant courts discretion to waive the
home study requirement). Second parent adoptions cost between $2,000 and $3,000 on
average and, depending on the jurisdiction, can cost upwards of $5,000.”).
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Unfortunately, however, second parent adoptions are only available on
a statewide basis in a minority of states.110
II.

POTENTIAL THEORIES UNDERLYING CURRENT LAW’S APPROACH TO
THE GESTATING PARENT’S DEGREE OF CHOICE IN AT-BIRTH
DETERMINATIONS OF THE SECOND LEGAL PARENT

As the discussion above illuminates, under current law, the degree of
choice that gestating parents have in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent differs significantly depending on the
gestating parent’s marital status, the method of conception, and the
gender of the potential second legal parent. For example, married
gestating parents and unmarried gestating parents who desire a woman
to be the child’s second legal parent generally have the least amount of
meaningful choice, with the degree of choice sometimes differing based
on the method of conception. On the other end of the spectrum,
unmarried gestating parents who desire a man to be the child’s second
legal parent are able to exercise the greatest amount of meaningful
choice within at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent,
regardless of the method of conception. In considering whether the
current legal framework governing the degree of choice gestating
parents have in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent
is need of reform, it is important to determine whether there is any
coherent underlying theory guiding the law’s approach to this issue that
would explain the vastly differing treatment of various categories of
gestating parents.
Throughout the years, jurists, scholars, and commentators have set
forth a range of ideas, analyses, and proposals regarding both what is
and what should be the underlying theory guiding the law’s approach
to parentage determinations. A number of these theories conceivably
could be guiding the law’s current approach to the more narrow issue
of the gestating parent’s degree of meaningful choice within
determinations of the child’s second legal parent at birth. This Part
identifies the most plausible potential theories and analyzes whether
any of the theories provides a consistent, coherent explanation for
current law’s approach to gestating parents’ choice in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent.

110 Id. at 81. Step- and second-parent adoption mechanisms are available only if there
is no existing second legal parent or the second legal parent’s rights are terminated. Id.
at 79-80.
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A. The Constitutional Law Theory
One possibility is that the underlying theory guiding the law’s current
approach to the degree of meaningful choice gestating parents may
exercise in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent is
based in constitutional law considerations. The starting point for the
constitutional law theory is that the gestating parent enjoys a
constitutionally protected relationship with the child at the time of
birth.111 The constitutional relationship derives from the act of gestating
and giving birth to the child, which necessarily involves both a
biological connection between the gestating parent and child112 and
significant parental functioning on the part of the gestating parent.113
As scholars have described, “the process of gestation [] creates a twoway biological connection . . . since cells pass between fetuses and their
gestational [parent] in both directions”114 and “the constant physical
proximity of [the gestating parent] and fetus and their interaction
during gestation necessarily gives rise to an everyday actual
relationship, allowing for bonding . . . even before birth.”115
The notion of constitutionally protected parent-child relationships
deriving from the combination of biological ties and parental
111 See, e.g., E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Function of Biological Paternity:
Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s Co-Parenting of Her
Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 107 (2006) (“A biological mother necessarily develops a
constitutionally meaningful relationship with her child by the time of the child’s
birth.”).
112 Even where the gestating parent does not share a genetic connection with the
child, there is still a biological connection between the child and the individual who
gestates the child. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism: The Case Against
Genetic Entitlement, 91 TUL. L. REV. 473, 499-500 (2017) [hereinafter Fathers and
Feminism] (describing the biological connection between the gestating parent and the
child that occurs regardless of the source of the genetic materials used to conceive the
child). The biological tie stemming from the gestational relationship is significant,
regardless of genetic ties. See Baker, supra note 14, at 47 (“Although courts have never
put it in these terms, the above suggests that the gestational mother gains parental status
through her gestational investment, not through her genetic contribution.”).
113 Spitko, supra note 111, at 107-08 (“Given that parental labor gives rise to
constitutional parental rights, the acts of carrying and delivering the child should
qualify the biological mother-child relationship for constitutional protection. During
her pregnancy and the birth of the child, the mother endures physical stresses and
changes to her body, a significant possibility of health complications, and the pains of
pregnancy and childbirth to give life to the child. Moreover, the constant physical
proximity of mother and fetus and their interaction during gestation necessarily gives
rise to an everyday actual relationship, allowing for bonding between mother and child
even before birth.”).
114 Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra note 112, at 499.
115 Spitko, supra note 111, at 108.
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functioning can be traced back to a series of Supreme Court decisions
regarding the rights of unwed biological fathers.116 This series of
opinions established the “biology-plus standard,” under which a
biological father who is not married to the individual who gave birth
establishes a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship only if
he “grasp[s] the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child”
and “demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his
child.’”117 In the unwed fatherhood cases, the Supreme Court appeared
to recognize that gestating parents’ share a constitutionally protected
relationship with the child, but did not explicitly apply the biology-plus
standard to gestating parents.118 While the Court did not expressly
identify satisfaction of the biology-plus standard as the basis for
recognizing the gestating parents’ constitutional rights, it appears that
the Court simply presumed that the acts of gestating and birth to the
child satisfy the biology-plus standard.119

116 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
389 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645, 654 (1972).
117 Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248, 261 (quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392); see also Caban, 441
U.S. at 392-94; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255-56. The Court has indicated, however, that the
constitutional protection for unwed fathers who satisfy the biology-plus standard does
not extend to situations where the gestating parent is married to someone else at the
time of the child’s conception or birth. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 142-43
(1989).
118 See Albertina Antognini, From Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and
at Home, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 405, 436 (2013) (stating that in Lehr, “the only
relevant criterion for the mother was, by default, the fact that she gave birth to her child;
just the father had to supplement the fact of biology with the establishment of a
perceptible relationship”).
119 Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 429,
441 (2007) (“All of the [Supreme Court’s] fatherhood cases assumed that the birth of a
child establishes the mother’s rights.”); Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra note
112, at 478 (“The biology-plus-relationship test recognized that a birth mother, by
gestating and giving birth, satisfied both criteria, but that for fathers, biological
parenthood did not automatically create a relationship that demanded full parental
rights.”); see also Gregg Strauss, What Role Remains for De Facto Parenthood?, 46 FLA.
STATE U. L. REV. 909, 957-58 (2019) (“Unlike paternity, the Supreme Court has never
addressed the factual ground for mothers’ constitutional rights. Nevertheless, simple
extensions of the biology plus test can support tentative conclusions. A woman who
gives birth to her own genetic child has full parental rights at birth, because she accepts
a measure of responsibility by performing the work of pregnancy and childbirth. . . .
Sometimes the Justices suggests pregnant women form emotional bonds with the fetus
in utero, which comes perilously close to gender stereotyping, but other times the Court
recognizes that pregnancy and childbirth are work that can justify additional rights.”).
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Under the constitutional law theory, because the acts of gestating and
giving birth to the child create a constitutionally protected parent-child
relationship, the gestating parent necessarily is “the child’s initial
‘constitutional parent.’”120 It is well established that the Constitution’s
Due Process Clause provides parents with the fundamental right to
make decisions regarding the care, custody, and control of their child.121
The gestating parent’s fundamental right to make decisions regarding
the care, custody, and control of the child, which the gestating parent
enjoys at birth as the initial constitutional parent, logically includes the
right to exercise meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent.122 There are differing views regarding how
much weight the law must afford the gestating parent’s choice in order
to avoid running afoul of the gestating parent’s constitutional rights.
Under some articulations of the constitutional law theory the law must
afford the gestating parent’s choice “special weight,”123 while under
other articulations of the theory the gestating parent’s wishes must be
determinative.124 Either way, the gestating parent’s right as the child’s
initial constitutional parent to exercise meaningful choice in the at-birth
determination of the child’s second legal parent exists unless or until
either the gestating parent has exercised that right or a second party has
been able to develop an offsetting constitutionally-protected parental
relationship with the child.125
One may argue that the law’s current approach to the degree of choice
gestating parents have in at-birth determinations of the child’s second
legal parent is consistent with the constitutional law theory. The
argument would proceed as follows. With regard to current law’s
120 Spitko, supra note 111, at 108; see also Baker, supra note 14, at 47; Hendricks,
Fathers and Feminism, supra note 112, at 476.
121 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this
case — the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children — is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”).
122 Spitko, supra note 111, at 99, 111 (stating that “labor gives [the gestating parent]
a constitutionally protected voice in the child’s upbringing, including a right to decide
generally who else shall be allowed to develop a parental relationship with the child”
and “the existing constitutional parent’s constitutional right to direct the moral
upbringing of her child should include the power to invite another to become a coparent to her child and even more certainly should include the power to prevent another
from becoming a parent to her child”); see also Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra
note 112, at 482 (“Moreover, the mother’s actual, established relationship at the time of
birth should also be protected, meaning that the state should not impose an additional
parent (genetic father or otherwise) without her consent.”).
123 See Hendricks, supra note 112, at 512.
124 Spitko, supra note 111, at 111-12.
125 Id.
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treatment of married gestating parents, while married gestating parents,
like unmarried gestating parents, enjoy a constitutionally-protected
relationship with the child that includes the right to exercise
meaningful choice in determinations of the child’s other parent, married
gestating parents necessarily have exercised that right by the time of the
child’s birth.126 Specifically, a married gestating parent already has
chosen their spouse as the second legal parent of any child born or
conceived during the marriage simply by virtue of their decision to
marry their spouse.127 If married gestating parents necessarily have
exercised their constitutional right to exercise meaningful choice within
the determination of the child’s second legal parent simply by marrying,
then a legal framework that provides automatic legal parentage to
spouses and denies married gestating parents the ability to utilize
mechanisms like VAPs to choose someone other than their spouse as
the child’s legal parent (either completely or absent the spouse’s
consent), is consistent with the constitutional law theory.128
An alternative argument for why current law’s approach to married
gestating parents is consistent with the constitutional law theory stems
from the contention that, at the time of the child’s birth, spouses of
married gestating parents have their own constitutional rights relating
to the child that offset those of the gestating parent. While not squarely
addressing the issue, the Supreme Court has, within its series of cases
on the rights of unwed biological fathers, made passing references to
the constitutional rights of a gestating parent’s spouse. For example, in
Quilloin v. Walcott, an unmarried biological father attempting to veto
his child’s adoption argued that the same constitutional standards that
would apply to a married biological father in this situation should apply
to him.129 In rejecting this argument, the Court seemed to suggest that,
unlike unwed biological fathers, spouses of gestating parents can be
presumed to satisfy both the biology- and function-related requirements
126 See Spitko, supra note 111, at 114; see also Baker, supra note 14, at 47 (“If the
gestational mother has not . . . previously agreed (through marriage or another form of
contract) to share parental rights, then she has exclusive control. Once she agrees, either
explicitly or implicitly, to share that control, she has a co-parent.”).
127 See sources cited supra note 126.
128 See Spitko, supra note 111, at 114 (“When the mother married her husband, she
implicitly contracted to allow that man to act as father to any child born of her during
their marriage.”). However, it is important to note that Professor Spitko further argued
that “the biological mother maintains the right to revoke her implicit consent arising
from her marriage at any time prior to the vesting of constitutional parental rights in
her husband” and that the husband’s constitutional rights would arise only after he had
engaged in sufficient parental functioning. Id.
129 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
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of the biology-plus standard.130 Specifically, the Court stated that “even
a father whose marriage has broken apart [and who is no longer living
with the child] will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his
children during the period of the marriage,” while an unmarried father,
like the one here, may have “never shouldered any significant
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of the child.”131
In another Supreme Court case, Michael H. v. Gerald D., an unwed
biological father sought to be determined the legal father of a child born
to a married woman over the objection of the woman and her husband,
who wished to continue to raise the child within their marriage.132 Both
the husband and the biological father had engaged in some degree of
parental functioning.133 In a plurality opinion holding that the law’s
provision of parental status to the husband and denial of parental status
to the biological father did not violate the Constitution, the Court
seemed to suggest that marriage to the gestating parent was equivalent
to biological ties for purposes of meeting the first prong of the biologyplus standard and that the husband in this case shared a constitutionally
protected relationship with the child.134 The court stated that when “the
child is born into an extant marital family, the natural father’s unique
opportunity [to develop a constitutionally protected relationship with
the child] conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the
husband of the marriage.”135
The constitutional law theory recognizes that the gestating parent no
longer has the exclusive right to make decisions regarding the child’s
care, custody, and control after another individual has established an
offsetting constitutionally protected relationship with the child.136 If,
130 Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra note 112, at 505 n.126 (citing Quilloin,
434 U.S. at 256) (“The Supreme Court, however, has suggested that the biology-plusrelationship may apply to all fathers; married fathers are simply presumed to have
satisfied it.”).
131 Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256.
132 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 110 (1989).
133 Id. at 114-15.
134 See id. at 129; see also Spitko, supra note 111, at 114 (“[M]arriage alone does not
give rise to constitutional parental rights in the husband under the labor-with-consent
theory. Rather, the husband must first labor sufficiently as a father before his
constitutional parental rights vest.”). Professor Gary Spitko has argued that in
determining constitutional protection for the parent-child relationship, the
constitutional significance of the marriage is akin to that of biological paternity because
both merely are proxies for the gestational parent’s consent to the individual being the
child’s other parent. Id.
135 Michael H., 491 U.S. at 128.
136 See Spitko, supra note 111, at 114-15; supra text accompanying note 125.
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from the time of the child’s birth, spouses enjoy constitutional rights
that offset those of gestating parents, then laws that prevent married
gestating parents from unilaterally choosing someone other than their
spouse as the child’s second legal parent at birth not only would be
consistent with a theory based on constitutional considerations, they
would be required under such a theory.137 Similarly, if the Constitution
provides protection to the spouses of gestating parents from the time of
the child’s birth, then the laws in around half of states that allow a
married gestating parent to execute a VAP at birth with someone other
than their spouse, but only if the spouse consents, also are consistent
with a theory based on constitutional considerations.138
In addition, current law’s approach of providing significantly greater
choice to unmarried gestating parents regarding the determination of
the child’s second legal parent at birth through mechanisms like VAPs
also could be viewed as consistent with the constitutional law theory.139
For example, providing unmarried gestating parents with a significantly
greater degree of meaningful choice at the time of the child’s birth could
be seen as consistent with a constitutional law theory if the lack of a
spouse necessarily means that a gestating parent has not yet exercised
their constitutional right to choose the second legal parent prior to the
child’s birth.140 Similarly, providing unmarried gestating parents with a
significantly higher degree of choice in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent arguably is consistent with a constitutional
law theory if the absence of a spouse necessarily means that there is no
other person who shares an offsetting constitutionally protected
relationship with the child at birth.141 Overall, if married and unmarried
gestating parents categorically differ from each other in such
constitutionally significant ways, then a framework that provides
unmarried gestating parents with a substantially greater degree of
meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal
parent arguably is consistent with a guiding theory based on
constitutional considerations.

137 Spitko, supra note 111, at 115 (“Michael H., therefore, is simply a case of the
mother being unable to impair the existing constitutional right of another — the right
of her husband to be the father to a child born during their marriage.”).
138 See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. The constitutional theory would
not, however, explain the approach of the other half of states, wherein the gestating
parent cannot execute a VAP with someone other than their spouse regardless of the
spouse’s consent.
139 See infra Part II.B.
140 See supra notes 126–128 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 129–138 and accompanying text.
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A closer analysis, however, demonstrates that constitutional
considerations do not provide a coherent, consistent theory for the law’s
current approach to the degree of meaningful choice gestating parents
are able to exercise in at-birth determinations of the child’s other legal
parent. The vastly differing treatment of married and unmarried
gestating parents under current law is not consistent with the
constitutional law theory.142 The argument that, by virtue of their
decision to marry, a married gestating parent necessarily has exercised
their right to meaningful choice within the determination of the child’s
second legal parent, is unpersuasive.143 If gestating parents obtain a
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship as a result of the
combination of biological ties and parental functioning necessarily
involved in the gestation process, their constitutional right to exercise
meaningful choice regarding the child’s other legal parent would not
arise prior to gestation.144 The gestating parent may have married their
spouse months, years, or decades before the child was conceived. It is
illogical to say that married gestating parents necessarily have exercised
their constitutional right to meaningful choice within the determination
of the child’s second legal parent simply by virtue of the decision to
marry, when in many cases the constitutional right does not yet exist at
the time the gestating parent entered into the marriage.
Moreover, it is hard to argue that in making the decision to marry,
which, again, may be done months, years, or decades before the child is
conceived, the gestating parent necessarily is also at that time choosing,
in any real way, the child’s other legal parent.145 Notably, allowing
decisions that are critical to the child’s wellbeing to be made at a time
that is often long before the child is even conceived is out of line with
well-established family law policies. For example, while courts give
great deference to provisions in divorcing parents’ marital settlement
agreements addressing each party’s custodial rights to their existing
children, a provision in a prenuptial agreement that purports to address
the custody of future children born to the marriage is void for public
policy reasons.146 The law recognizes that a person should not be
considered to have made a sufficiently informed, meaningful decision

142

See supra Part I.A (describing the marital presumption).
See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text.
144 See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text.
145 See Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 952 (“[T]he decision to marry has little to do
with legal parenthood”).
146 Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and Marital
Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 319 (2012).
143
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regarding something as important to their child’s wellbeing as custodial
rights at a time when the child often has not yet even been conceived.147
The alternative argument for why the mandatory at-birth provision of
legal parentage to spouses is consistent with the constitutional law
theory — that at the time of the child’s birth spouses are entitled to
constitutional rights and protections that offset those of the gestating
parent — is also unpersuasive. The standard articulated by the Supreme
Court for establishing a constitutionally-protected parent-child
relationship centers on biology and function.148 Even assuming that
spouses are entitled to a presumption that they satisfy the biology part
of the standard either due to assumed biological ties or because the
marriage acts as a substitute for biological ties, there is still the functionbased requirement.149 Importantly, the Supreme Court’s statements in
Quilloin and Michael H. suggesting that spouses may be presumed to
satisfy the function-based requirement of the standard were made in
reference to spouses who had lived in an intact family unit with the
gestating parent and child for some significant period of time.150 It is a
wholly different matter to conclude that the Court’s statements mean
that spouses categorically can be presumed to have satisfied the
function-based aspect of the standard at the moment the child is born.
It is highly unlikely that at the time of the child’s birth — a time when
the spouse would have had no prior direct contact with the child — the
spouse could have satisfied the function-based requirement of the
biology-plus standard.151

147 See id.; see also Sarah Abramowicz, Contractualizing Custody, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
67, 76 (2014) (“A further objection expressed in the context of premarital agreements
is that a premarital custody agreement should be given especially little deference by
custody courts, because it is highly unlikely to be either knowing or voluntary. . . .
Courts are quick to assert the absurdity of permitting parents to bind themselves, and
to limit the discretionary power of the courts on matters of custody, on the basis of ‘an
agreement entered into before the child in question has come into the world.”).
148 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text.
149 Spitko, supra note 111, at 114 (“Just as with biological paternity, marriage alone
does not give rise to constitutional parental rights in the husband . . . . Rather, the
husband must first labor sufficiently as a father before his constitutional parental rights
vest.”).
150 See supra notes 130–135 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
statements in Quilloin and Michael H.).
151 Spitko, supra note 111, at 111-12 (“The biological mother’s status as initial
constitutional parent necessarily vests prior to any possible vesting of constitutional
rights in the biological father . . . [because], in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances, the biological father is unable to perform sufficient labor to become a
constitutional parent by the time of the child’s birth.”).
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Even if a spouse’s pre-birth actions can be considered evidence of
parental functioning, at the time of the child’s birth, it is difficult to
imagine that a spouse could have engaged in anywhere close to the level
of parental functioning that a gestating parent necessarily has
undertaken during the (often) nine-plus months of gestating the child
and the process of giving birth.152 It is unlikely that the degree of
constitutional protection that would arise from the spouse’s pre-birth
conduct would be enough to offset the constitutional protections
arising from the gestating parent’s pre-birth conduct.153 This would
mean that the gestating parent’s wishes still would be entitled to some
level of constitutional protection in determinations of who is deemed
the child’s second legal parent at birth. Moreover, if pre-birth conduct
could satisfy the function requirement of the biology-plus standard, it
would mean that both spouses and unwed individuals who shared a
biological tie with the child could achieve constitutionally-protected
rights prior to the child’s birth. For the current legal framework’s
differing treatment of married and unmarried gestational parents to be
152 Baker, supra note 14, at 47-48 (“At a very basic level, there is simply no
comparison between what a mother necessarily gives during pregnancy and what a man
can give. Thus, by virtue of her sole responsibility and labor, the mother obtains sole
parental rights.”); Spitko, supra note 111, at 107-08, 112, 125-26 (stating that “[d]uring
her pregnancy and the birth of the child, the mother endures physical stresses and
changes to her body, a significant possibility of health complications, and the pains of
pregnancy and childbirth to give life to the child. Moreover, the constant physical
proximity of mother and fetus and their interaction during gestation necessarily gives
rise to an everyday actual relationship, allowing for bonding between mother and child
even before birth” and “[i]n all but the most extraordinary circumstances, the biological
father is unable to perform sufficient labor to become a constitutional parent by the time
of the child’s birth”); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the
Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 276 (2006)
(“I would find it impossible to conclude that the men’s pre-birth conduct (or anyone
else’s behavior during that time) could so overwhelm the parental contributions of the
gestating woman that they would satisfy a functional test more certainly than she
would.”); Leslie Bender, “To Err is Human” ART Mix-Ups: A Labor-Based, Relational
Proposal, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 443, 487-90 (2006) (describing the gestating parent’s
“incomparable type and amount of labor in creating the child”); Hendricks, Fathers and
Feminism, supra note 112, at 523-24 (“Birth creates a biologically unique relationship
between mother and child. Women should have greater decision-making authority over
certain reproductive decisions because that authority is a necessary correlate of their
greater burden. It is not a matter of tit for tat, or payment for services, but a matter of
acknowledging the entanglement of bodies and souls that inheres in pregnancy and
birth. Without denigrating the ‘deep and proper concern’ that a man may have in a
pregnancy, he is not situated to make initial decisions over whether a new being should
be brought into the world, and if so into what family.”).
153 See sources cited supra note 152 (describing the unparalleled contributions that
the gestating parent makes prior to the child’s birth).
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driven by constitutional considerations, there would have to be an
assumption that all spouses engage in sufficient functioning to satisfy
the biology-plus standard prior to birth and anyone who is not a spouse
does not. Even under the most generous assumptions about spouses and
the least generous assumptions about unmarried biological parents, this
seems untenable.
It is important to note that the same type of problem arises even if the
Supreme Court’s unwed fatherhood cases are read to suggest that
biological fathers and spouses have a constitutionally protected
opportunity interest in forming a parent-child relationship that satisfies
the biology-plus standard (a reading with which many scholars
disagree).154 If married gestating parents cannot utilize mechanisms like
VAPs at birth to choose a child’s second legal parent because someone
else, the gestating parent’s spouse, may have a constitutionally
protected opportunity interest at the time the child is born, it would
follow that unmarried gestating parents also cannot utilize such
mechanisms because someone else, a person who shares a biological tie
to the child, may have a constitutionally protected opportunity interest
at the time of the child’s birth. Overall, current law’s vastly differing
treatment of married and unmarried gestating parents with regard to the
ability to exercise meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent is inconsistent with a theory based upon
constitutional considerations.
Finally, the constitutional law theory is inconsistent with the general
restriction of the use of VAPs to the establishment of parentage for men.
Under the constitutional law theory, unmarried gestating parents retain
a constitutionally protected right to exercise meaningful choice in
determinations of the child’s other legal parent at birth.155 There is no
constitutional law consideration that would compel states to limit this
right to unmarried gestating parents who desire a man to be the child’s
second legal parent. Not only do constitutional considerations fail to
explain current law’s approach to the availability of VAPs, but the
current approach may actually violate the Constitution. While a full
discussion of the constitutionality of existing VAP laws is beyond the
scope of this Article, there is a strong argument that the Due Process
and Equal Protection considerations that resulted in the Obergefell
Court striking down laws that prevented same-sex couples from
exercising the fundamental right to marry apply to laws that restrict
154 See, e.g., Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra note 112, at 479-83, 481 n.24
(examining whether “the Constitution also protect[s] a genetic father’s opportunity to
form such a relationship with the child” and concluding that it does not).
155 See supra notes 111–125 and accompanying text.
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individuals in same-sex relationships from exercising other familyrelated fundamental rights.156 If the gestating parent has a fundamental
right to exercise meaningful choice within the determination of their
child’s other legal parent, then restricting that fundamental right based
upon the gender of the potential second parent may well run afoul of
current constitutional law principles.157 In sum, the constitutional law
theory does not provide a consistent, coherent explanation for current
law’s approach to the degree of choice gestating parents may exercise in
at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent.
B. The Gestating Parent Knows Best Theory
Because the gestating parent knows best theory overlaps in significant
ways with the constitutional law theory, only a brief discussion of this
theory is necessary. Under both theories, the law should recognize the
right of gestating parents to exercise meaningful choice in the
determination of who is deemed the child’s second legal parent at the
time of birth.158 The major difference is that while under the
constitutional law theory the right stems from constitutional
considerations, under the gestating parent knows best theory the right
stems from policy considerations. Specifically, under the gestating
parent knows best theory, gestating parents should have the right to
exercise meaningful choice in the determination of who is deemed the
child’s second legal parent at birth because gestating parents are in the
best position to make decisions that will further the best interests of the
child.159 At the time of the child’s birth, the gestating parent will have
engaged in significantly more parental functioning than anyone else.160
Moreover, by going through the intensive process of gestating the child
for nine months and giving birth to the child, the gestating parent will
have demonstrated a greater investment in and commitment to the child

156 See Harris, supra note 68, at 482-87 (laying out constitutional arguments in favor
of extending VAPs to same-sex couples).
157 Id. at 487.
158 See Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 948 (“Under my proposal, it is the right of the
birth mother to designate a second parent.”).
159 Id. at 943 (“My proposal centers on the birth mother because, in my view, doing
what is good for young children usually means doing what seems best to the child’s key
caretaker. In the case of infants, the key caretaker is almost always the birth mother. . . .
If she decides to designate a partner, she can designate whomever she wants”).
160 See supra note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the parental functioning
performed by the gestating parent during the process of gestating and giving birth to
the child).
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than anyone else.161 As a result, as a policy matter, the law should trust
the gestating parent to make a decision regarding the child’s second
legal parent that furthers, and is guided by, the best interests of the
child.162
The current legal framework governing gestating parents’ degree of
choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent is
inconsistent with the gestating parent knows best theory for reasons
similar to those discussed in the context of the constitutional law
theory. Under the current legal framework, married gestating parents
do not have the right to exercise meaningful choice within the
determination of who is deemed the child’s other legal parent at the time
of birth.163 The gestating parent’s spouse will be deemed the child’s legal
parent at birth pursuant to the marital presumption, even if the
gestating parent believes that establishing parentage in someone other
than their spouse would promote the child’s best interests.164 Married
gestating parents cannot (either at all or absent their spouse’s consent)
utilize mechanisms like VAPs to establish someone other than their
spouse as the child’s second legal parent at birth.165
Any argument that the current approach to married gestating parents
is consistent with the gestating parent knows best theory because
married gestating parents necessarily have exercised their right to
choose the child’s other legal parent by marrying their spouse, is
unconvincing. As discussed above, the gestating parent’s decision to
marry their spouse may occur well before the child is even
contemplated, let alone conceived.166 This reality renders unpersuasive
any argument that all married gestating parents necessarily have already
exercised meaningful choice regarding the child’s parentage.167
Relatedly, if the gestating parent should, as a matter of policy, have the
right to choose the child’s second legal parent because of their parental
functioning and the great commitment and investment in the child they
have demonstrated through gestation, it would be illogical to say they
have exercised that right prior to having engaged in any gestation.

161

See Bender, supra note 152, at 486-90.
Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 949 (arguing that the gestating parent “has more
capacity than anyone else in the world to make decisions for the child that are beneficial
to the child”).
163 See supra Part II.A.
164 See supra Part I.A.
165 See id.
166 See supra notes 143–144 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text.
162

2022]

Parent Zero

2307

Restricting the use of VAPs to the establishment of parentage for men
also is inconsistent with the gestating parent knows best theory. If the
law is guided by the theory that the gestating parent — as a result of the
incomparable degree of parental functioning, commitment, and
investment they have demonstrated by the time of the child’s birth — is
in the best position to determine the child’s second legal parent, then it
makes sense to allow the gestating parent to choose the child’s second
legal parent by executing a document with that person at the time of the
child’s birth. However, the same reasoning dictates that if the gestating
parent, as the person who knows best, determines the child’s interests
are best served by establishing someone who happens to be a woman as
the child’s second legal parent, the law should respect that decision.
Denying gestating parents the use of VAPs to establish the child’s
second legal parent based solely on the gender of the desired co-parent
is inconsistent with the gestating parent knows best theory. In sum, like
the constitutional law theory, the gestating parent knows best theory
fails to provide a coherent, consistent explanation for the current legal
framework governing gestating parents’ choice in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent.
C. The Mutual Intent Theory
Another possibility is that the law’s current approach to gestating
parents’ degree of choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second
legal parent is guided by a theory that prioritizes mutual intent. Under
the mutual intent theory, if, at the relevant point in time, the gestating
parent and another party mutually agree that the party will be the child’s
other legal parent, then the law should provide at-birth legal parentage
to that party.168 The mutual intent theory is less focused on the unique
rights of the gestating parent than the previously-discussed theories,
and more focused on protecting the interests of both the gestating
parent and the individual who the parties intended to be the child’s
second legal parent.169 It should be noted, however, that even under this

168 See generally Baker, supra note 14 (proposing a contracts-based theory for
determining parentage); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and IntentBased Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297 (1990)
(describing the intent-based approach and advocating for its usage in parentage
determinations that arise in the assisted reproduction context).
169 See Shultz, supra note 168, at 302-03 (“Accordingly, I propose that legal rules
governing modern procreative arrangements and parental status should recognize the
importance and the legitimacy of individual efforts to project intentions and decisions
into the future. Where such intentions are deliberate, explicit and bargained for, where
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theory the gestating parent and the non-gestating parent are not on
equal footing — mutual intent is only required to establish the legal
parentage of the non-gestating parent.170
Proponents of intent-based theories to parentage determinations
contend that relying on the parties’ demonstrated mutual intent in
determinations of who should be deemed a legal parent promotes
fairness and protects the expectations and reliance interests of the
parties.171 Proponents also maintain that providing parentage to the
individuals who intended to serve as the child’s parents generally
promotes children’s best interests because a person’s demonstrated
intent to become a child’s parent has “great importance as indic[ia] of
desirable parenting behavior.”172 In addition, the parties’ mutual intent
to serve as the child’s co-parents at a time when the child was
contemplated demonstrates that the parties share a cooperative
relationship and a commitment to raising the child together.173 This is
important because having two legal parents who are committed to a
collaborative co-parenting relationship also furthers children’s best
interests.174
There are a number of aspects of the current legal framework
governing the degree of choice gestating parents have in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent that arguably are
consistent with the mutual intent theory. In terms of married gestating
parents, if the parties’ mutual consent to the marriage also necessarily
encompasses their mutual consent to the non-gestating spouse being
the second legal parent of any child born to or conceived by the
gestating spouse during the marriage, then the at-birth provision of
legal parentage to spouses pursuant to the marital presumption is
consistent with the mutual intent theory.175 In addition, if a theory
based on mutual intent allows the parties to mutually withdraw their
they are the catalyst for reliance and expectations, as is the case in technologicallyassisted reproductive arrangements, they should be honored.”).
170 See Baker, supra note 14, at 47 (“[The second parent] gains parental status
through [their] relationship with the mother. If the gestational mother has not
contracted her labor out (in a gestational surrogacy contract) or previously agreed
(through marriage or another form of contract) to share parental rights, then she has
exclusive control. Once she agrees, either explicitly or implicitly, to share that control,
she has a co-parent.”).
171 Shultz, supra note 168, at 302-03.
172 Id. at 343.
173 Id.
174 See infra Part II.D.
175 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 89 (2016);
Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 261-62.
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consent to the spouse being the second legal parent up until the time
the spouse otherwise would attain legal parentage (generally the time
of the child’s birth), then the approach of the approximately half of
states that allow a married gestating parent to execute a VAP at birth
with a male third party if the gestating parent, the spouse, and the third
party all mutually consent, also seems consistent with such a theory.176
Moreover, it seems clear that spousal consent to ART laws —
assuming that such laws explicitly or implicitly require consent from
both parties — are consistent with the mutual intent theory.177 These
laws provide a conclusive presumption of legal parentage at birth to the
spouse of a gestating parent who conceives via ART if the parties
provided the requisite consent to the spouse being the child’s second
legal parent.178 Under most states’ consent to ART laws, the parties’
mutual consent must exist at the time the gestating parent undertakes
the ART procedure.179 Under the most recent Uniform Parentage Act’s
consent to ART standard, however, mutual consent that occurs after the
ART procedures are undertaken also can satisfy the standard.180 Under
either approach, the focus is the existence of the parties’ mutual consent
at the relevant point or period in time.
In terms of unmarried gestating parents, the parties’ expression of
mutual intent is the core component of the most common method of
establishing the child’s second legal parent at birth, the VAP.181 VAP
procedures allow for a man to be established as the child’s second legal
parent at birth through the unmarried gestating parent and the man
consenting in a signed, witnessed writing to the man being recognized
as the child’s second legal parent.182 It is important to note, however,
that in order to be effective in establishing the child’s second legal
parent, the mutual consent expressed through the VAP must continue
to exist (i.e., not be rescinded) for sixty days following its execution.183
More specifically, either party can unilaterally rescind the VAP within
sixty days,184 but after sixty days the VAP must be considered a legal
finding of paternity.185
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2.
Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 278-79.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 704, 707 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
See Harris, supra note 68 and accompanying text.
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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While a number of important aspects of the current legal framework
governing the degree of choice gestating parents have in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent are consistent with the
mutual intent theory, there are some core aspects that are not. First, the
current legal framework’s automatic, mandatory provision of legal
parentage to the spouses of married gestating parents at birth pursuant
to the marital presumption, which does not require any expression of
mutual consent or intent from the parties aside from the consent
required to enter the marriage, does not comport well with the mutual
intent theory.186 As discussed above, the decision to marry may occur
years before the child is conceived or even contemplated by the
parties.187 An approach to at-birth parentage determinations that is
guided by a theory based upon mutual intent would require, at the least,
a meaningful manifestation of intent that relates to the question actually
at issue, the child’s parentage. In fact, the existence of spousal consent
to ART laws, which provide legal parentage to spouses based upon the
existence of mutual intent at the time the ART procedures are
undertaken, indicates that the law recognizes that the existence of the
marriage at the time of conception or birth, standing alone, is not
necessarily an effective proxy for the parties’ mutual intent regarding a
child’s legal parentage.188 Yet not only does current law fail to inquire
into the intent of married gestating parents and their spouses before
providing automatic parentage to the spouse at birth, in half of states
this result cannot be avoided even where all interested parties agree that
the requisite mutual intent does not exist between the gestating parent
and the spouse and does exist between the gestating parent and a third
party.189
In addition, the limitation of consent to ART statutes to married
couples in most states is also inconsistent with the mutual intent
theory.190 It is indisputable that, like many married couples who
conceive via ART, there are unmarried couples who undertake ART
with the mutual intent for the non-gestating partner to be the resulting
child’s second parent. If spousal consent to ART standards are
consistent with the mutual intent theory because the law recognizes that
parties can express meaningful, informed mutual intent regarding the
child’s legal parentage at the time of undertaking ART procedures, then
it is inconsistent to limit this mechanism for establishing the child’s
186
187
188
189
190

See supra Part I.A.1.
See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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second legal parent at birth to married people who undertake ART.191 A
legal framework guided by considerations based upon fairness and
protecting the parties’ expectations stemming from their mutual intent
for the non-gestating partner to be the child’s second legal parent would
not exclude parties from that protection based solely on their marital
status.
The limitation of the use of VAPs to individuals who wish to establish
a man as the child’s second legal parent is similarly inconsistent with
the mutual intent theory.192 Mutual intent between a gestating parent
and another individual for that individual to be the child’s second legal
parent undoubtedly can exist regardless of the individual’s gender. The
gender of the potential second parent has nothing to do with the
question of whether the parties mutually intended for that person to be
the child’s second legal parent. A legal framework governing the
gestating parent’s degree of choice in at-birth determinations of the
child’s second legal parent that is guided by a theory based upon mutual
intent would not refuse to recognize an intended second parent as the
child’s legal parent based solely on their gender.
Finally, even among the current mechanisms of establishing at-birth
legal parentage that are broadly consistent with the mutual intent
theory, there exist important discrepancies relating to the timing at
which the parties’ mutual intent becomes legally relevant. Namely,
under most spousal consent to ART laws, the requisite mutual intent
must exist at the time of undertaking the ART procedures involved in
conceiving the child.193 VAPs, on other hand, generally require that the
mutual intent exists at or after the child’s birth and continues for sixty
days following the execution of the VAP — most states do not allow for
the execution of VAPs prior to the child’s birth.194 If legally relevant
mutual intent regarding the determination of the child’s second legal
parent can exist at the time of undertaking conception and at the time
of birth, then the law should provide parties with legal mechanisms to
demonstrate their requisite mutual intent at either point, regardless of

191

See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. As noted above, the 2017 Uniform
Parentage Act does not follow this approach. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
194 Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Reforming the Processes for Challenging
Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 177, 181 (2017) (“Thus,
while a few states permit post-conception, pre-birth VAPs, many do not.”).
192
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the parties’ marital status or the method of conception.195 It is hard to
see why, under a theory based upon fairness and protecting the parties’
expectations stemming from their mutual intent, the timing at which
the parties could utilize the existing mechanisms for establishing atbirth parentage based upon mutual intent would differ depending on
these characteristics. Moreover, whereas mutual intent under the
current legal framework is measured at either the time of undertaking
conception or the child’s birth, a legal framework guided by
considerations relating to the parties’ mutual intent likely also would
provide mechanisms that allow the parties to establish parentage based
upon mutual intent that arises in the period between conception and
birth.196
D. The Intact, Harmonious Family Theory
Another possibility is that the law’s current approach to the degree of
choice gestating parents have in at-birth determinations of the child’s
second legal parent is guided by considerations that relate to furthering
the rearing of children in intact, harmonious familial relationships. The
choice to utilize this type of guiding theory would stem from the belief
that children and families benefit when the child’s two legal parents
share an intact, low conflict relationship.197 Because under current law
the gestating parent generally is the child’s initial legal parent,198 a
theory based upon promoting the rearing of children in intact,
harmonious family relationships would provide at-birth parentage to
the individual who is considered most likely to raise the child alongside
the gestating parent in a harmonious, unified family unit.199 In addition,
195 See Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in Former Partner Parenting
Cases: Hiding Behind the Facade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 623,
660-61 (2012).
196 See id. at 661 (“In fact, it is unclear why the intent to become a parent should be
legally relevant only if it takes place before the child’s conception. Whether that intent
existed, and whether it was demonstrated through particular understandings and
conduct, would seem to be more important than its precise timing . . . .”).
197 Gregory M. Herek, Evaluating the Methodology of Social Science Research on Sexual
Orientation and Parenting: A Tale of Three Studies, 48 UC DAVIS L. REV. 583, 587-88
(2014). This is one of the common justifications for the marital presumption of
parentage. Feinberg, Restructuring Rebuttal, supra note 3, at 258-59.
198 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text.
199 See Jessica Feinberg, After Marriage Equality: Dual Fatherhood for Married Male
Same-Sex Couples, 54 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1507, 1552-53 (2021); cf. Dowd, supra note 67,
at 913 (suggesting that the law assign at-birth parentage to individuals who “have
demonstrated acts of nurture toward the child and an affirmative commitment to
cooperative parenting with the mother”).
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by providing legal parentage at birth to this individual, the law also
decreases the chance that the child’s birth will create conflict in the
relationship between the gestating parent and the individual, who as a
practical matter, is most likely to rear the child alongside the gestating
parent.200
There are a number of aspects of the current legal framework
governing gestating parents’ degree of choice in at-birth determinations
of the child’s second legal parent that arguably are consistent with a
theory that is based on promoting the rearing of children in intact,
harmonious family relationships. In fact, on a broad scale, one could
argue that under current law, the more stable and committed the
relationship between the gestating parent and another individual
appears, the more likely it is that the individual will be deemed the
child’s second legal parent at birth. For example, marriage long has been
viewed as the most stable type of intimate adult relationship.201 This is
not only because of the public commitment the parties make to each
other, but also because of the wide variety of legal rights, benefits, and
obligations afforded on the basis of marriage that serve to promote
stability in the relationship.202 If the fact of marriage to the gestating
parent serves as an effective proxy for identifying the individual most
likely to raise the child alongside the gestating parent in a unified, stable
family structure,203 then a legal framework that automatically assigns
parentage at birth to spouses is consistent with a theory based upon
promoting child rearing in intact, harmonious family relationships.
There also are aspects of current law’s approach to unmarried
gestating parents that arguably are consistent with the intact,
200 For example, avoiding disruption to the marital relationship long has been cited
as one of the justifications for the marital presumption. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 125 (1989).
201 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 669 (2015) (“[T]his Court’s cases and
the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”);
Marcia Zug, Mail Order Feminism, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 153, 156 (2014)
(“For Americans, marriage continues to represent the essential values that are important
to intimate relationships, and as a result, in America, marriage represents the highest
form of commitment.”).
202 See Obergefell, 576 U.S. at 669-70 (“[J]ust as a couple vows to support each other,
so does society pledge to support the couple, offering symbolic recognition and material
benefits to protect and nourish the union. Indeed, while the States are in general free to
vary the benefits they confer on all married couples, they have throughout our history
made marriage the basis for an expanding list of governmental rights, benefits, and
responsibilities.”).
203 See Dowd, supra note 67, at 929 (suggesting that the fact of marriage could satisfy
the requirement under the parentage proposal set forth in the Article that the individual
share “a positive, caring relationship with the other parent”).
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harmonious family theory. For example, one could argue that outside
of marriage, the best indication that the gestating parent and another
individual share the type of stable relationship that renders that
individual the person most likely to raise the child alongside the
gestating parent in a unified family unit, is that the parties are mutually
willing to consent to the individual establishing legal parentage at the
time of birth. The joint execution of a legal document in which the
gestating parent and another individual agree that the individual should
be deemed the child’s second legal parent arguably evidences not only
the parties’ strong desire to raise the child together, but also their
shared, serious commitment to doing so.204 If this is the case, then it
would explain the use of VAPs as the core at-birth mechanism for
establishing the second legal parent of a child born to an unmarried
gestating parent.205
The intact, harmonious family theory also could explain why the law
generally provides the earliest-available, simplest, and most efficient
mechanisms for establishing parentage to individuals who share either
a marital or cooperative relationship with the gestating parent. The
marital presumption, spousal consent to ART laws, and VAPs, which
require either no action or merely executing a document with the
gestating parent, only can be utilized to provide at-birth legal parentage
to individuals who share a marital or cooperative relationship with the
gestating parent at the time of conception or birth.206 Individuals who
do not share a marital or cooperative relationship with the gestating
parent at the time of conception or birth generally must initiate postbirth legal proceedings and demonstrate, at a minimum, genetic ties to
the child in order to establish parentage.207 If individuals who share a
marital or cooperative relationship with the gestating parent at the time
of conception or birth are most likely to raise the child in an intact,
harmonious family structure with the gestating parent, it makes sense
for the law to promote at-birth parentage establishment in these
individuals over other potential second parents.208

204 See id. at 921 (“The empirical data thus strongly suggests that men present at
birth, birthfathers, are committed to the child and the mother, and intend to remain an
active presence in the lives of both mother and child.”); Hendricks, Fathers and
Feminism, supra note 112, at 517 (“The VAP process thus substitutes for marriage by
allowing for the creation of a coparenting relationship by mutual consent.”).
205 See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
206 See supra Part II.C.
207 See supra notes 51, 84 and accompanying text.
208 See Dowd, supra note 67, at 935 (suggesting that requiring either marriage to the
gestating parent or the consent of the gestating parent in order for an individual to
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While the outer contours of the current legal framework governing
gestating parents may seem consistent with the intact, harmonious
family theory, there are a number of key aspects of current law that are
inconsistent with such a theory. As an initial matter, the current
approach to married gestating parents, under which legal parentage
automatically attaches to spouses pursuant to the marital presumption
and gestating parents cannot (either at all or absent the spouse’s
consent) utilize mechanisms like VAPs to establish someone else as the
child’s second legal parent at birth, is inconsistent with the intact,
harmonious family theory. While in most cases the spouse is the person
who is most likely to raise the child in an intact, harmonious
relationship with the gestating parent, and most married gestating
parents, if given the choice, would choose their spouse as the child’s
other legal parent at the time of birth, this simply is not true across the
board.209 As discussed above, at the time of the child’s birth a gestating
parent may not share an intact, harmonious relationship with the
person to whom they were or are married at the time of conception or
birth and, for various reasons, may not want that person to be the child’s
second legal parent.210 These reasons may include, for example, that
because of a lengthy divorce process, the parties were living as if the
marriage was over at the time of the child’s conception or birth, and the
gestating parent may never have intended for the spouse to be the child’s
legal parent; the spouse is abusive; or the gestating parent, for another
reason, believes that providing legal parentage to the spouse will have
unhealthy or dangerous consequences for them or the child.211
Importantly, if at the time of the child’s birth a married gestating
parent and a third party wish to raise the child together, it is unlikely
that current law’s approach of mandating an at-birth determination of
legal parentage for the spouse will increase the probability that the child
will be raised by two legal parents who share an intact, harmonious
relationship.212 In this situation, where it is unlikely that the gestating
parent and their spouse share an intact, harmonious relationship, but
the gestating parent and the individual who they would like to be the
child’s second legal parent do share such a relationship, the current legal
framework likely has the opposite effect. Moreover, even when the
establish legal parentage through voluntary acknowledgment procedures is a “means to
ensure that the relationship between [the legal parents] is cooperative and affirmative”).
209 See Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 953 (“If the mother is married at the time the
child is born, she is likely to designate her husband as her parental partner.”).
210 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
211 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
212 See supra Part II.A.
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gestating parent, a third party, and the spouse all agree that the third
party should be the child’s second legal parent, which may be an even
clearer indication that the spouse is not the person most likely to be
raising the child in an intact, harmonious relationship with the gestating
parent, around half of states nonetheless require that legal parentage
attach to the spouse at birth.213 The current legal framework’s
mandatory at-birth determination of legal parentage for spouses
regardless of the gestating parent’s wishes and its overall failure to
account for situations in which the spouse is not the individual who is
most likely to raise the child in a unified family unit with the gestating
parent, is inconsistent with the intact, harmonious family theory.
In addition, current law’s approach of limiting the use of VAPs to the
establishment of parentage for men also is inconsistent with the intact,
harmonious family theory.214 It is indisputable that in a significant
number of cases, the individual who is the most likely to raise the child
in an intact, harmonious family with the gestating parent is a woman or
non-binary individual. There are tens of thousands of same-sex couples
who are raising children together,215 many of whom undoubtedly would
take advantage of VAP procedures to establish the legal parentage of the
non-gestating parent if given the opportunity.216 In addition,
transgender men who are gestating parents also may desire for a woman
or non-binary individual to be the child’s second legal parent.217 If VAPs
are consistent with the harmonious, intact family theory because the
willingness of a gestating parent and a second individual to consent at
birth to that individual obtaining legal parentage effectively identifies
the person most likely to raise the child in a unified family unit with the
gestating parent, then prohibiting women from establishing parentage
through VAPs is inconsistent with this theory.

213

See supra note 52–53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
215 U.S. Census Bureau Releases CPS Estimates of Same-Sex Households, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2019/samesex-households.html [https://perma.cc/W4EB-CW4E].
216 See generally Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1 (proposing the
extension of VAP procedures to same-sex couples).
217 See Rob Bailey-Millado, Transgender Man Gives Birth to Baby Using Sperm from
Trans Woman, N.Y. POST (Dec. 30, 2019), https://nypost.com/2019/12/30/transgenderman-gives-birth-to-baby-using-sperm-from-trans-donor/ [https://perma.cc/D8GD-HF6U];
Nara Schoenberg, In a First for Illinois, Transgender Man Who Gave Birth Will Be Listed
as the Father on His Baby’s Birth Certificate, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 14, 2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-life-first-transgender-birth-certificate-tt01132020-20200114-qfbbf3dvufhppid5shjru6l5xu-story.html [https://perma.cc/6QQU8SHJ].
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E. A Note on a Less Plausible Theory: The Genetics-Based Theory
Considerations relating to genetic connections historically have
played a significant role in both legal and societal conceptions of
parentage.218 It therefore is necessary to briefly address the possibility
that a genetics-based theory is guiding the law’s current approach to the
degree of choice gestating parents may exercise in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent, even though this
theory does not share the plausibility of the theories discussed above.
More specifically, it may be tempting to argue that the law’s current
treatment of gestating parents is guided by the theory that the law
should seek to establish the child’s biological father as the child’s second
legal parent at birth.219 Although this argument may be tempting, it is
not persuasive. In the context of both married and unmarried gestating
parents, the core mechanisms used to provide at-birth legal parentage
to a second person under current law are inconsistent with the geneticsbased theory.
In terms of married gestating parents, current law’s automatic,
mandatory provision of legal parentage to the gestating parent’s spouse
at birth pursuant to the marital presumption and/or spousal consent to
ART laws is inconsistent with the genetics-based theory. While before
the advent of DNA testing, one could argue that a core purpose of the
marital presumption was to provide legal parentage to the individual
most likely to be the child’s biological father,220 today there are widelyavailable, efficient DNA tests that determine if an individual is the
child’s biological father with a high degree of accuracy.221 The marital
presumption’s automatic provision of legal parentage to spouses
without any inquiry into whether the spouse shares a genetic tie to the
child, despite the widespread availability of DNA tests, is not consistent
with a theory grounded in providing at-birth legal parentage to the
child’s biological father.222 In addition, the approach in half of states of
prohibiting married gestating parents from designating someone other
than their spouse as the child’s legal parent at birth, even when the
gestating parent, the spouse, and a third party all aver that the third
218 Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child Custody Disputes
Between Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331, 340-46 (2016) [hereinafter
Consideration of Genetic Connections].
219 See infra notes 220, 228 and accompanying text.
220 Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections, supra note 218, at 341.
221 Paternity Tests: Blood Tests and DNA, FINDLAW (Oct. 2, 2018), https://family.
findlaw.com/paternity/paternity-tests-blood-tests-and-dna.html [https://perma.cc/DKT4BD9R].
222 See supra Part I.A.1.
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party is the child’s biological father, directly contradicts the geneticsbased theory.223 Moreover, with the extension of the marital
presumption to female spouses of gestating parents, it is illogical to
claim that the marital presumption’s automatic provision of legal
parentage to spouses continues to be grounded in providing parentage
to the child’s biological father.224 While, as discussed above, genetic
connections may play a significant, though not necessarily
determinative, role in actions challenging the marital presumption, they
do not play any role in establishing parentage through this
mechanism.225
Spousal consent to ART laws, which provide a conclusive
presumption of legal parentage to spouses who consent to the gestating
parent’s use of ART with the intent to be the resulting child’s parent,
represent an even clearer contradiction of the genetics-based theory.
Spousal consent to ART laws are aimed at ensuring that, if the requisite
consent was provided, the spouse conclusively is deemed the child’s
legal parent at birth even if the child was conceived using sperm from a
third party donor.226 When an individual’s parentage is recognized
pursuant to a spousal consent to ART law, a lack of genetic ties to the
child cannot later be used as a basis to challenge that individual’s status
as the child’s second legal parent — the parties’ consent is the only
consideration in establishing the individual’s parentage and genetic ties
(or lack thereof) are irrelevant.227 Consequently, the conclusive
provision of legal parentage to spouses pursuant to spousal consent to
ART laws clearly is inconsistent with a theory that is based upon
establishing the child’s biological father as the child’s second legal
parent.
In terms of unmarried gestating parents, VAP procedures, which
provide unmarried gestating parents who desire a man to be the child’s
second legal parent with a significant degree of choice in determining
who is deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth, also are
inconsistent with the genetics-based theory. While many states’ VAP
forms or accompanying instructions state that the parties are attesting
under penalty of perjury that, to the best of their knowledge, the man
is the child’s biological father, states cannot and do not require that a
man undergo a DNA test before his parentage can be established
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See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
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through a VAP executed at the time of the child’s birth.228 The result is
a system in which an unmarried gestating parent can utilize a VAP to
establish the parentage of their desired male co-parent, regardless of the
man’s genetic ties to the child or lack thereof.229 While, as discussed
above, genetic ties may play a significant, though not necessarily
determinative, role in actions challenging VAPs, proof of genetic ties
(despite the accessibility of genetic testing) is not a requirement of
establishing parentage through VAPs.230
For all of the reasons set forth above, the current legal framework
governing the degree of choice gestating parents have in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent clearly is inconsistent
with the genetics-based theory. Genetic connections do not play a
significant role in the core mechanisms that exist under current law to
establish a child’s second legal parent at birth: the marital presumption,
spousal consent to ART laws, and VAPs.231 While genetics-related
considerations may play a more significant role in establishing an
individual as the child’s legal parent after birth, either when there is no
existing second legal parent232 or when the parentage of the individual
established as the child’s second legal parent at birth is challenged,233
the argument that the genetics-based theory is guiding current law’s
approach to gestating parents’ degree of choice in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent is unconvincing.
Overall, although there is no one theory that provides a fully
consistent, coherent explanation for the law’s current approach to
gestating parents’ choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second
legal parent, there are some core principles that emerge among the
plausible theories. These core principles should play an important role
in guiding efforts to reform current law to create a more coherent,
consistent, and just legal framework governing gestating parents’
choice. The following Part first identifies and explains the core
principles that emerge among the plausible theories. It concludes by
providing some initial thoughts regarding potential reforms to better
align current law with these core principles and create a more coherent
legal framework governing gestating parents’ choice.
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See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1.
See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.1.
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III. BEGINNING THE PROCESS OF BRINGING CONSISTENCY AND
COHERENCE TO THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Core Principles that Emerge Across the Plausible Theories
In analyzing the plausible guiding theories for the law’s approach to
the degree of meaningful choice gestating parents can exercise in atbirth determinations of the child’s second legal parent, certain core
principles emerge. Identifying and understanding these principles is an
essential initial step in determining the type of legal reform that is
necessary to bring coherence and consistency to the legal framework
governing this issue. The first core principle is that the gestating parent
should be able to exercise a significant degree of meaningful choice in
the determination of who is deemed the child’s second legal parent at
birth. Under the constitutional law and gestating parent knows best
theories, the substantial parental functioning and commitment to the
child demonstrated by the acts of gestating and giving birth to the child
provide the gestating parent with the right to exercise a significant
degree of meaningful choice in the determination of who is deemed the
child’s second legal parent at birth.234 Specifically, under these theories,
the gestating parent’s wishes must be, at the least, given special weight
in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent.235 The
gestating parent’s ability to exercise significant meaningful choice also
is central to the mutual intent theory. Under this theory, an individual
cannot become the child’s second legal parent unless, at the relevant
point in time, the gestating parent actually intended for the individual
to be the child’s legal parent.236 Finally, considerations based in
respecting the gestating parent’s choice play a key role under the intact,
harmonious family theory. By providing parentage to the individual
who is most likely to raise the child in an intact, harmonious family
with the gestating parent, this theory places the plans and wishes of the
gestating parent at the center of the determination of the child’s second
legal parent.237
As the analyses of the plausible theories in the previous Part highlight,
providing the gestating parent with a significant degree of meaningful
choice in determining who will be deemed the child’s second legal
parent at birth makes sense for a number of reasons.238 It is hard to
234
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237
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See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Parts II.A-D.
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dispute that leading up to the child’s birth, gestating parents undertake
an unmatched level of commitment to and care of the child.239 To say
that another party’s rights to determine who should be deemed the
second legal parent at birth are as strong as the rights of the gestating
parent, would be to erase the incomparable, imperative work that
gestating parents undertake.240 Furthermore, as the person who has
shown an unparalleled commitment to the well-being of the child, it is
logical to conclude that the gestating parent is in a better position than
anyone else (including the state) to determine who should be deemed
the child’s second legal parent at birth in accordance with the child’s
best interests.241 Relatedly, providing the gestating parent with
significant meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s
other legal parent also is consistent with the furtherance of children’s
best interests for the reason that children generally benefit when their
parents share a cooperative relationship.242
A related core principle that emerges from the analyses of the
plausible theories is that, in the determination of who should be deemed
the child’s second legal parent at birth, the type of relationship the
potential second parent shares with the gestating parent should play an
important role.243 More specifically, all of the theories indicate that the
law should promote at-birth parentage establishment in individuals
who, at some relevant point after the child’s existence (current or
future) has become a reality,244 share with the gestating parent a
cooperative relationship and commitment to raising the child as coparents. In terms of the constitutional law and gestating parent knows
best theories, if given the choice, gestating parents almost certainly
would identify as the child’s second legal parent an individual with
whom they share a positive, cooperative relationship and a commitment
239

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
See Baker, supra note 14, at 63 (“Refusing to honor what is unquestionably a
greater contribution [on the part of the gestating parent] smacks more of oppression
than equality.”); Hendricks, Fathers and Feminism, supra note 112, at 498-500
(“[D]isregarding gestation in the definition of parenthood is, literally, patriarchal; it is
the ‘law of the father.’”); see also Bender, supra note 152, at 486-88; supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 159–162 and accompanying text.
242 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
243 See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 6, at 122 (“This Article, therefore, revisits the
contested question of at-birth parentage determination and argues that the relationship
between potential joint parents should be a central factor in determining a child’s
parentage.”); supra Parts II.A–D.
244 Depending on the theory, the relevant point could range from the time the parties
undertake the procreative endeavor to the time of the child’s birth.
240
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to co-parenting.245 Thus, by providing gestating parents with the right
to exercise a significant degree of meaningful choice in determinations
of who is deemed the child’s second legal parent at birth, these theories
increase the likelihood that the child’s legal parents share a cooperative
relationship and commitment to co-parenting.246 Moreover, the mutual
intent theory, by making the parties’ shared intent for an individual to
be the child’s second legal parent the essential requirement, is
completely dependent on the existence of a cooperative relationship and
commitment to co-parenting between the gestating parent and potential
second parent at the relevant point in time.247 Promoting at-birth
parentage establishment in individuals who share with the gestating
parent a cooperative relationship and commitment to co-parenting also
is undoubtedly at the core of the intact, harmonious family theory,
which strives to establish at-birth legal parentage in the individual who
is most likely to raise the child together with the gestating parent in a
harmonious family unit.248
There are a number of important considerations that support
prioritizing the establishment of at-birth parentage in individuals who,
at the relevant point in time, share a cooperative relationship and
commitment to co-parenting with the gestating parent. As an initial
matter, it is well established that co-parenting relationships that are
high in conflict and low in cooperation can result in significant harm to
a child’s wellbeing and that children generally benefit when their
parents share a cooperative, low conflict co-parenting relationship.249 If
the gestating parent wishes for a certain individual to be the child’s
second legal parent, but the law mandates an at-birth parentage
determination in someone else — i.e., someone who the gestating
parent does not want to be the child’s other legal parent — it creates a
situation where conflict between the child’s parents likely will inhere
from the start.250 In addition to the harm to the child, parental conflict
245

See Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 950.
See supra Parts II.A, II.B.
247 See supra Part II.C.
248 See supra Part II.D.
249 Herek, supra note 197, at 587-88; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of
Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741, 763-64 (2016); Nancy Ver Steegh, The Unfinished
Business of Modern Court Reform: Reflections on Children, Courts, and Custody by Andrew
I. Schepard, 38 FAM. L.Q. 449, 452 (2004) (book review).
250 See James G. Dwyer, A Child-Centered Approach to Parentage Law, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 843, 852 (2006) (“[I]t might be that a [gestating parent’s] objection to a
particular other person’s becoming a parent should be respected regardless of [their]
reasons, simply because [their] objection in and of itself makes harmonious coparenting with that person unlikely . . . .”).
246
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also can negatively affect the wellbeing of the parents and burden the
legal system.251
Moreover, it is also arguably in the child’s best interests to have as a
second parent an individual who has explicitly “opted in” to being the
child’s legal parent and raising the child cooperatively with the gestating
parent.252 As discussed above, advocates of intent-based approaches to
parentage determinations have stressed that intent to be a child’s parent
is an important indicator of positive parenting behavior, explaining that
“[t]he concept of intent . . . embodies desirable and positive values by
focusing on those who willingly and lovingly undertake parenthood.”253
Importantly, research suggests that an individual’s agreement with the
gestating parent to become the child’s second parent is a significantly
better indicator that the individual will be an active parent who supports
the child than other considerations, such as genetic ties.254
Certain aspects of the current legal framework — including its
approach to married gestating parents and its restriction of VAPs to
parentage establishment for men — clearly violate the core principles
that emerge from the plausible theories. Specifically, they run afoul of
the principles that: (1) the gestating parent should have a significant
degree of meaningful choice in determinations of the child’s second
legal parent; and (2) the law should facilitate at-birth parentage
establishment in individuals who, at some relevant point after the
child’s existence (current or future) has become a reality, shares with
the gestating parent a cooperative relationship and commitment to
raising the child as co-parents. In fact, in the analyses of the plausible
theories set forth in Part III, these aspects of current law were identified
as inconsistent with every one of the theories.

251 See Sanford L. Braver, Irwin N. Sandler, Liza Cohen Hita & Lorey A. Wheeler, A
Randomized Comparative Effectiveness Trial of Two Court-Connected Programs for HighConflict Families, 54 FAM. CT. REV. 349, 350 (2016); Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 249, at 764.
252 Baker, supra note 14, at 51-52; see also Dowd, supra note 67, at 913 (stating that
to promote the well-being of children, “I propose that at birth we identify a ‘birthfather’
in order to confer parentage. I use the term ‘birthfather’ here not to identify the
biological father, but rather to establish whether a social father is present at birth. A
‘birthfather’ would have demonstrated acts of nurture toward the child and an
affirmative commitment to cooperative parenting with the mother. This status would
be based on his actions during the pregnancy, his presence at childbirth, and his
voluntary acknowledgment of paternity”).
253 See Blecher-Prigat, supra note 6, at 176; supra note 172 and accompanying text.
254 Baker, supra note 14, at 51-52; cf. Dowd, supra note 67, at 921 (“The empirical
data thus strongly suggests that men present at birth, birthfathers, are committed to the
child and the [gestating parent], and intend to remain an active presence in the lives of
both [the gestating parent] and child.”).
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As discussed above, under the current approach to married gestating
parents, legal parentage automatically attaches to spouses at birth and
the gestating parent lacks the ability (either at all or absent the spouse’s
consent) to choose someone else as the child’s second legal parent at
birth.255 This is directly contrary to the core principle that the gestating
parent should have a significant degree of meaningful choice in at-birth
determinations of the child’s second legal parent. Moreover, current
law’s failure to provide for situations in which the gestating parent and
spouse have shared neither a cooperative relationship nor a
commitment to co-parenting, but the gestating parent shares such a
relationship with someone else, clearly runs afoul of the core principle
of promoting parentage establishment in individuals who share a
cooperative relationship and commitment to co-parenting with the
gestating parent.
The restriction in the vast majority of states of the use of VAPs to
gestating parents who wish to establish a man as the child’s second legal
parent also runs counter to the core principles that emerge from the
plausible theories. It is well established that there are gestating parents
— including many gestating parents who are in same-sex relationships
— who desire and plan to raise their child with someone who is a
woman or non-binary individual.256 In the vast majority of states,
however, anyone who is not a man is categorically excluded from
obtaining parentage through VAP procedures. 257 Restricting the use of
VAPs to the establishment of parentage for men denies unmarried
gestating parents who desire a woman or non-binary individual to be
the child’s second legal parent the ability to exercise meaningful choice
in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal parent. In addition,
this aspect of current law also runs afoul of the second core principle
by denying parentage to an individual who shares a cooperative
relationship and commitment to co-parenting with the gestating parent
simply because that individual happens to be a woman or non-binary
person.
Overall, the core principles that emerge across the plausible legal
theories offer a clear indication that certain aspects of the current legal
framework governing gestating parents are in urgent need of legal
reform. These areas, which include the law’s approach to married
gestating parents and the eligibility requirements for establishing
parentage through VAPs, undoubtedly should be a primary focus of
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See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 215–217 and accompanying text.
Supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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initial reform efforts. As will be discussed in more detail below, other
aspects of the current legal framework, such as the restriction of consent
to ART laws to spouses, also are problematic in light of the core
principles. However, the level of urgency for reform of such laws is less
clear given the alternative methods of parentage establishment that are
(or will be under the proposed initial reforms) available to the
categories of individuals that such laws exclude.
B. Starting Points for Legal Reform
It is important to make clear at the outset that the discussion in this
Section centers on proposed legal reforms to the laws governing the
determination of the child’s second legal parent at the time of the child’s
birth. There undoubtedly will be, as there are now, various
considerations that states determine are important enough to provide a
basis for post-birth challenges to the parentage of the person identified
as the child’s second legal parent at the time of birth.258 Extensive
analysis of the potential substantive and procedural rules for post-birth
challenges, however, is beyond the scope of this Article. The focus of
this Article is the law governing at-birth determinations of the child’s
second legal, which retains immense importance because in the vast
majority of cases the legal parentage of the individual identified as the
child’s second legal parent at the time of birth will never be challenged.
It is also important to make clear that the discussion that follows is not
intended to provide a comprehensive proposal for reforming current
parentage law. Rather, the goal is to provide a starting point for further
discussion regarding potential steps that could be taken to create a more
coherent legal framework governing gestating parents’ choice and to
better align current law with the core principles identified above.
As the discussion above highlights, there are two areas of the law —
the framework governing married gestating parents and gender-based
VAP eligibility restrictions — that are most clearly in need of legal
reform.259 These areas of the law are inconsistent with each of the
plausible theories for the law’s approach to the gestating parent’s degree
of choice in determinations of the child’s second legal parent as well as
the core principles that emerge across the theories.260 For one of these
areas — the restriction of VAPs to the establishment of parentage for
men — the type of legal reform necessary is fairly straightforward. VAP
laws should be amended so that men, women, and non-binary
258
259
260

See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Parts I.A, I.B.1.
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individuals who comply with the relevant procedures are able to
establish parentage through VAPs.261
Remedying the problematic gender-exclusionary aspects of VAP laws
and procedures could be accomplished, for the most part, through
modest reforms such as making the language of VAP statutes, forms,
and instructions gender neutral and eliminating the requirement on
some states’ VAP forms relating to the signer attesting to being the
child’s biological parent.262 Otherwise, existing standards set forth by
the federal government governing VAP procedures, such as the sixtyday rescission period, the legal effect of unrescinded VAPs, and the
limited grounds for challenges to VAPs (fraud, duress, and material
mistake), could remain the same.263 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act,
for example, establishes VAP procedures for women, men, and nonbinary individuals who qualify under the Act as intended or presumed
parents (provided there is no other individual who is already recognized
under the Act as the child’s second legal parent),264 and maintains the
sixty-day rescission period and limited grounds for challenges following
the rescission period.265 For those aspects of VAP procedures for which
states currently have some leeway to adopt their own standards, such as
the rules governing who has standing to challenge VAPs, states could
maintain their existing rules or decide to adopt new ones.266 However,
it is important that such rules apply uniformly regardless of the gender
of the individual identified as the child’s second legal parent through
the VAP.
Adopting gender-neutral VAP laws would align the primary method
of parentage establishment for children born to unmarried gestating
parents with the two core principles that emerge from the plausible
theories underlying the law’s approach to gestating parents’ choice in
determinations of the child’s second legal parent. More specifically, it
would significantly enhance the degree of meaningful choice provided
to unmarried gestating parents who wish for a woman or non-binary
individual to be the child’s second legal parent — a category of gestating
261 See generally Harris, supra note 68 (proposing the extension of VAPs to same-sex
couples).
262 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
263 See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
264 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 301-302, 308-309 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). If there is an
existing presumed parent, the gestating parent can execute a VAP with someone else if
the presumed parent executes a denial of parentage. Id. § 302(b)(1).
265 The 2017 Uniform Parentage Act requires that challenges to VAPs after the
rescission period occur within two years from the execution of the VAP. Id. § 309.
266 State laws currently differ with regard to the categories of individuals who have
standing to challenge VAPs. Parness, Faithful Parents, supra note 76, at 351-53.
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parents that is largely denied meaningful choice under the current legal
framework governing at-birth parentage determinations.267 In addition,
by providing parentage to the individual who mutually agrees with the
gestating parent to be the child’s other legal parent at the time of birth,
it would facilitate at-birth parentage establishment in individuals who
share with the gestating parent a cooperative relationship and
commitment to raising the child as co-parents.
With regard to the other area of the legal framework governing
gestating parents that is most clearly in need of legal reform — the
treatment of married gestating parents — determining the type of
reform that will be most effective is a more complex undertaking. It is
important to note at the outset that any proposal that involves changes
to the longstanding marital presumption, particularly ones that give
gestating parents greater power in identifying someone other than their
spouse as the child’s second legal parent, likely will face significant
pushback. It would be a mistake to ignore the role that historical views
regarding gender roles within the family may play in this context. It
long has been the case, and remains true today, that the vast majority of
gestating parents are women268 and that the vast majority of spouses of
gestating parents are men.269 While there may be legitimate reasons for
maintaining the current legal framework governing married gestating
parents’ choice, it is likely that some degree of the resistance to
considering changes to the marital presumption stems from entrenched
and lingering gendered attitudes regarding the rights of married
women.
The United States adopted both the marital presumption270 and the
legal doctrine of coverture from English common law.271 Under the legal
doctrine of coverture, women who married lost their independent legal
existence — married women’s legal rights and obligations were

267

See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Transgender men can also gestate and give birth to children, which is why this
Article uses the gender-neutral term “gestating parent.”
269 U.S. Census Bureau Releases CPS Estimates of Same-Sex Households, supra note 215
(explaining that, as of 2019, there were approximately 543,000 same-sex married
couple households as compared to 61.4 million different-sex married couple
households in the United States).
270 Glennon, supra note 29, at 563-65.
271 Sandra R. Zagier Zayac & Robert A. Zayac, Jr., Georgia’s Married Women’s
Property Act: An Effective Challenge to Coverture, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 81, 83-84
(2005).
268
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subsumed by their husband.272 The law of coverture remained
widespread until the latter half of the nineteenth century.273 As a result,
both the marital presumption and the subordination of married women
to their husbands are deeply rooted in the nation’s history. This history
may help to explain why the law has developed in a such a way that,
while unmarried gestating parents enjoy a significant degree of
meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of the child’s second legal
parent, married gestating parents remain unable (either at all of absent
their spouse’s consent) to identify someone other than their spouse as
the child’s second legal parent at birth. It is important to recognize that
the attitudes and beliefs underlying the historical subordination of
married women to their husbands may linger, and to be mindful of not
allowing these problematic attitudes and beliefs to prevent serious
consideration of potential reforms to the legal framework governing
married gestating parents’ choice.
There are a number of potential options to consider for restructuring
the law governing married gestating parents to better align it with the
core principles of: (1) providing gestating parents with a significant
degree of meaningful choice, and (2) facilitating parentage
establishment in individuals who, at some relevant point after the
child’s existence has become a reality, shares with the gestating parent
a cooperative relationship and commitment to raising the child as coparents. One potential option is to maintain a presumption that the
individual to whom the gestating parent is married at the time of
conception or birth is the child’s second legal parent, but to provide
gestating parents who desire someone other than their spouse to be the
child’s second legal parent with a mechanism for opting out of the
presumption at birth.274 Maintaining the marital presumption in some
form seems logical — it is likely that in the vast majority of cases the
gestating parent and their spouse mutually desire for the spouse to be
the child’s second legal parent and share a cooperative relationship and
commitment to co-parenting.275 The marital presumption thus provides
an extremely efficient method of establishing legal parentage in the
individual who, in most cases, all of the relevant parties agree should be
272 Claudia Zaher, When a Woman’s Marital Status Determined Her Legal Status: A
Research Guide on the Common Law Doctrine of Coverture, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 459, 460-61
(2002).
273 Id. at 461.
274 See Dwyer, supra note 250, at 852 (“In my proposal, I do this by giving the birth
mother a veto over automatic conferral of parental status on her husband if she is
married.”).
275 See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
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the child’s second legal parent. It also ensures that children born to
married gestating parents have two legal parents from the time of
birth.276 However, if the marital presumption is maintained in some
form, providing a mechanism for gestating parents to opt out is
essential.
Though it will not be the norm, there undoubtedly will be instances
in which the gestating parent and the individual to whom they were
married at the time of the child’s conception or birth do not share a
cooperative relationship or commitment to co-parenting the child, and
the gestating parent desires for someone else to be deemed the child’s
second legal parent at birth.277 To promote the core principles of
providing gestating parents with meaningful choice and facilitating
parentage in individuals who share with the gestating parent a
cooperative relationship and commitment to co-parenting, there must
be a mechanism that allows gestating parents to opt-out of the marital
presumption regardless of whether their spouse consents. This would
be a significant change to current law — married gestating parents
cannot execute VAPs with a third party under any circumstances in half
of states and in the other half of states the spouse’s consent is required
in order for a married gestating parent to execute a VAP with a third
party.278
There are various options for structuring the procedural and
substantive components of an opt-out mechanism. For example, the
packet of documents that gestating parents routinely fill out at the
hospital following the child’s birth could include a form that allows the
gestating parent to opt out of the marital presumption by executing
some version of a voluntary acknowledgement of parentage with
someone other than their spouse. Since federal law does not require
states to extend federal VAP procedures to married gestating parents,
states presumably would have discretion in establishing the rules
governing voluntary acknowledgements executed by married gestating
parents with someone other than their spouse.279 The rules would not
have to mirror those required by federal law for unmarried gestating
parents, which mandate that VAPs constitute a legal finding of
276

See supra Part I.A.
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
278 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
279 45 C.F.R. § 303.5(g)(1)(i) (2022) (“The hospital-based portion of the voluntary
paternity establishment services program must be operational in all private and public
birthing hospitals statewide and must provide voluntary paternity establishment
services focusing on the period immediately before and after the birth of a child born
out-of-wedlock.” (emphasis added)).
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parentage after sixty days and limit subsequent challenges to claims of
fraud, material mistake, or duress.280 States could establish different
rules governing the legal effect of voluntary acknowledgments executed
by a married gestating parent with someone other than their spouse.
This could include, for example, having the acknowledgement create a
presumption of parentage as opposed to the equivalent of a legal finding
of parentage or requiring that a longer time period pass before the
acknowledgement is considered a legal finding of parentage. States
could also explicitly grant spouses in this situation standing to seek to
rebut the acknowledgement on a wider range of grounds and establish
rules that govern parentage determinations when there are competing
claims of parentage involving a VAP executed by a married gestating
parent with someone other than their spouse.
It is important to note that the proposed opt-out mechanism would
provide gestating parents with the ability to utilize voluntary
acknowledgement procedures to opt out of the marital presumption
only. It would not extend to the other marriage-based ground for
establishing at-birth parentage in the spouse — spousal consent to ART
laws.281 Assuming that spousal consent to ART laws require both
parties’ consent, a mechanism to allow gestating parents to opt-out of
the operation of such laws is not necessary;282 this is because spousal
consent to ART laws align with the core principles identified above. In
terms of the first principle, spousal consent to ART laws provide the
gestating parent with meaningful choice in the at-birth determination
of the child’s second legal parent. In a situation where, at the time of
undertaking ART procedures, both parties consent to the spouse being
the resulting child’s second legal parent, the gestating parent has made
a choice directly regarding the question at issue, the child’s parentage,
at a time when the child is contemplated. In terms of the second core
principle, by requiring both parties’ consent to the spouse attaining
parental status at (or after) the time of undertaking the procreative
endeavor, spousal consent to ART laws facilitate at-birth parentage
establishment in individuals who share with the gestating parent a
cooperative relationship and commitment to co-parenting at a point
when the child’s future existence has become a reality.283 This type of
restriction on the use of voluntary acknowledgements is consistent with
the approaches taken by the 2017 Uniform Parentage Act and a number
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See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.2.
See supra note 60.
See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
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of states, under which a VAP is void or voidable if, when executed,
another individual was entitled to recognition as the child’s legal parent
pursuant to a consent to ART provision.284
Another possibility would be for states to do away with the marital
presumption entirely and extend some form of voluntary
acknowledgment of parentage procedures to spouses of married
gestating parents.285 This would result in VAPs being a primary
mechanism of at-birth parentage establishment for second parents,
regardless of the parties’ marital status. There are persuasive
justifications for adopting this type of approach. A tempting argument
for maintaining the marital presumption is that, in the vast majority of
cases, it seamlessly provides parentage to the individual who the
gestating parent desires to be the child’s second legal parent and who is
committed to raising the child together with the gestating parent.286
However, replacing the marital presumption with voluntary
acknowledgement procedures arguably would accomplish the same
goal, but with greater precision. In instances where the gestating parent
desires for the spouse to be the child’s second legal parent and the
couple is committed to raising the child together, merely requiring the
parties to execute a simple document available at every birthing hospital
and birth records office likely would not pose a barrier to the spouse
establishing parentage. At the same time, by not presuming the spouse’s
parentage or requiring the gestating parent to take affirmative action to
opt out of the presumption, this approach would more effectively avoid
at-birth parentage determinations in spouses in situations where the
gestating parent does not want the spouse to be the child’s second legal
parent and the parties do not share a cooperative relationship or
commitment to co-parenting. As discussed above, states could adopt
specific rules governing voluntary acknowledgements entered into
between a married gestating parent and someone other than their
spouse.287
284 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1862(3) (2022) (stating that a VAP is
voidable if there is an acknowledged, adjudicated, or intended parent or a presumed
parent who has not executed a denial of parentage); UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 302(b)(2)
(UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (describing how an acknowledgement of parentage may be void
if, when signed, “an individual, other than the woman who gave birth to the child or
the individual seeking to establish parentage, is an acknowledged or adjudicated
parent”).
285 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 128-30; see generally Jacobs,
supra note 73, at 469 (advocating for “[i]ntentional parenthood as the default
framework to establish all at-birth parent-child relationships”).
286 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, it is important to address a significant potential
downside to wholly abolishing the marital presumption and adopting
VAPs as the primary method of establishing the second legal parent of
children born to married gestating parents. Namely, that there likely
would be fewer children who, from the time of birth, have two legal
parents. This is because, although it likely would be rare, at least some
married gestating parents would choose not to execute a VAP with
anyone, including their spouse, at the time of the child’s birth. In
addition, there will be some spouses who refuse to execute a VAP
despite the gestating parent’s willingness to do so. As a result, there will
be children who have only one legal parent at birth, but who would
have had two legal parents at birth if the marital presumption had been
in place. This is a significant concern, as “a child with two legally
recognized parents has access to important financial support and
inheritance, healthcare, social security, and other benefits from two
sources instead of just one.”288
One response to this concern is that in the rare cases where a married
gestating parent does not designate their spouse (or anyone else) as the
child’s second legal parent at birth, the gestating parent likely has
reasons for doing so that are important to both the gestating parent and
the child.289 In addition, states have well-established mechanisms for
establishing an individual as the child’s second legal parent post-birth,
particularly for purposes of providing the child with financial
support.290 Even so, the potential decrease in the number of children
who have two legal parents from the time of birth is a concern with
which states will need to grapple in deciding which type of approach to
adopt for married gestating parents.291 It is important to note that the
opt-out mechanism option discussed above does not raise the same

288 Feinberg, A Logical Step Forward, supra note 1, at 113; see also Melanie B. Jacobs,
Micah Has One Mommy and One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological
Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341, 346-47 (2002) (“[L]egal parenthood . . . entitles
a child to receive child support, qualify as a dependent on her parent’s health insurance,
collect Social Security benefits from her parent, sustain an action for wrongful death,
recover under a state worker’s compensation law, and in many states, to inherit from
her parent.”).
289 Czapanskiy, supra note 43, at 953.
290 See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text.
291 Compare Baker, supra note 14, at 16 (“A child is best off with two parents and if
no other man fills the role, the biologically connected man should.”), with Czapanskiy,
supra note 43, at 949-54 (setting forth a number of reasons for why the designation of
a second parent at birth should not be required for children born to married gestating
parents without the gestating parent’s consent, despite the potential implications for
child support).
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concern regarding fewer children having two legal parents from the
time of birth. Under the opt-out approach, the law will recognize the
spouse as the second legal parent at birth unless the opt-out mechanism
is utilized, in which case the law instead will recognize the individual
who executes the VAP with the gestating parent as the second legal
parent. While there are pros and cons to adopting either approach, each
represents a potentially viable option for aligning the legal framework
governing married gestating parents with the core principles identified
above.
There are other areas of the law governing gestating parents for which
the need for reform exists, but the level of urgency for engaging in such
reform may be less clear (particularly if states adopt the reforms
proposed above). The primary example of this is consent to ART laws,
which provide parentage to an individual who consents to the gestating
parent’s use of ART with the intent to be the resulting child’s parent,
but extend only to spouses in most jurisdictions.292 As discussed above,
assuming consent to ART laws are interpreted to require both parties’
consent, these laws are consistent with the core principles of providing
meaningful choice for gestating parents and facilitating at-birth
parentage establishment in individuals who, after the child’s existence
has become a reality, share with the gestating parent a cooperative
relationship and commitment to co-parenting.293 It undoubtedly is
problematic to categorically exclude individuals from establishing
parentage through a mechanism that furthers these core principles
based solely on their marital status. Reform to expand consent to ART
laws arguably is somewhat less urgent, however, because a significant
portion of the category of excluded individuals — unmarried couples
who wish to be the child’s legal co-parents — long has been able to
utilize an easily accessible, efficient alternative method of establishing
parentage at birth: VAPs.294 Importantly, while not all unmarried
couples have had access to VAPs, since in most jurisdictions parentage
establishment through VAPs has been limited to men, under the reform
proposed above VAPs would be available to establish the parentage of
individuals of any gender.295
292

See supra notes 58–59, 91 and accompanying text.
If a state’s consent to ART law is not interpreted as requiring the gestating parent’s
consent, then reforming the law to require the gestating parent’s consent is absolutely
necessary to align the law with the core principle that the gestating parent should have
a significant degree of meaningful choice in determinations of the child’s second legal
parent.
294 See supra Part I.A.
295 See supra notes 261–267 and accompanying text.
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The level of urgency for reform to consent to ART laws also differs
depending on the primary theory that a jurisdiction determines should
guide its approach to the role of gestating parents in determinations of
the child’s second legal parent. For example, under the intent-based
theory, reform to extend consent to ART laws to unmarried individuals
would have a high level of urgency regardless of the availability of VAPs
to all unmarried individuals. The intent-based theory focuses in large
part on protecting the reliance interests and expectations stemming
from the parties’ agreement at the time of undertaking the ART
procedures to be the parents of any resulting children.296 While VAPs
recognize the mutual intent that exists between the parties at the time
of the child’s birth, VAPs generally do not provide parentage based upon
the intent that the parties shared at the time of undertaking the ART
procedures.297 As a result, if between the time of undertaking ART
procedures and the child’s birth one of the parties changes their mind
about whether the non-gestating parent should be the child’s second
legal parent, a legal framework for parentage establishment that
employs VAPs, but not consent to ART laws, will fail to protect the other
party’s reliance interests and expectations.
If, however, a jurisdiction adopts the intact, harmonious family
theory to guide its approach to the legal framework governing gestating
parents’ choice, extending consent to ART laws to unmarried
individuals likely would have significantly less urgency. Where the
gestating parent and the individual who intended to be the child’s
second legal parent at the time of undertaking the ART procedures still
plan to raise the child together in an intact, harmonious family at the
time the child is born, they can become the child’s legal parents by
executing a VAP. If that relationship has broken down prior to the
child’s birth, however, and the gestating parent shares an intact,
harmonious relationship with someone else who desires to be the child’s
parent, establishing parentage in that person arguably would be a
preferable result under the intact, harmonious family theory.298 As a
result, jurisdictions that adopt the intact, harmonious family theory
may opt to focus primarily on legal reform that makes VAP procedures
available to all couples regardless of marital status or gender; reforming
consent to ART laws may be a lower priority.
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See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
See Jeffrey A. Parness, Systematically Screwing Dads: Out of Control Paternity
Schemes, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 641, 665 (2008) (“[P]re-birth voluntary paternity
acknowledgments are often not allowed.”).
298 See supra Part II.D.
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Overall, however, intent has become an increasingly important
concept under the law governing parentage establishment.299 This is
especially true in the ART context, where today intent commonly plays
a core role in parentage determinations.300 It is almost certainly the case
that intent-based theories will continue to play a significant guiding role
in parentage determinations for children conceived via ART. As a result,
it is likely that in most jurisdictions that choose to take steps to create
a more consistent, coherent, and just legal framework governing
gestating parents, extending consent to ART laws to unmarried
individuals will be a high priority. Finally, while most states that have
extended their consent to ART laws to unmarried individuals have done
so in a gender neutral manner, this is not true across the board.301 As
discussed above, to align the law with the core principles relating to
providing meaningful choice for gestating parents and facilitating
parentage establishment in individuals who share a commitment to coparenting with the gestating parent, it is essential that mechanisms for
establishing an individual as a child’s second legal parent at birth do not
categorically exclude women and non-binary people.302
CONCLUSION
While current law provides some categories of gestating parents with
a significant degree of meaningful choice in at-birth determinations of
the child’s second legal parent, other categories of gestating parents may
find that they have no meaningful choice in this consequential
determination. The differing treatment of gestating parents based upon
marital status, the method of the child’s conception, and the potential
second legal parent’s gender, is problematic. There is no underlying
theory that provides a consistent, coherent explanation for the law’s
current approach to the degree of choice gestating parents have in atbirth determinations of the child’s second legal parent. Legal reform that
provides all gestating parents with sufficient meaningful choice and
promotes parentage determinations in individuals who share a
cooperative relationship and commitment to co-parenting with the
gestating parent is necessary to create a more fair and consistent
framework governing the rights of gestating parents.
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Feinberg, supra note 3, at 263-64.
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See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.

